The European Commission has placed migration at the centre of its answer to demographic decline after publishing its third Demography Report, warning that Europe’s workforce is shrinking while its population rapidly ages.
According to EUobserver, Commissioner for Demography Dubravka Šuica gave migration particular weight, describing it as ‘a necessity’ for countering a declining workforce because most prospective migrants are of working age.
According to the report, the EU population is projected to peak at 453.3 million in 2029 before falling to 398.8 million by 2100. By 2038, Europeans aged between 20 and 40 are expected to be outnumbered by those over 65. The working-age population could contract by an average of 1.2 million annually until 2050—or twice that number under a zero-migration scenario.
‘As fertility rates decline, migration has become an important driver of population change,’ the report states, ‘counterbalancing the negative effects of population ageing and labour force contraction.’ It adds that ‘migration can help address labour shortages and support economic growth’, presenting legal migration from outside the EU as an opportunity to fill vacancies and promote innovation.
Brussels is already constructing the machinery to open routes for so-called ‘population change’. Talent Partnerships are intended to connect workers in partner countries with European industries, while the planned EU Talent Pool will match non-EU jobseekers with vacancies in healthcare, construction, ICT, transport, and logistics.
Yet the report’s more sober passages expose the weakness in Šuica’s ‘necessity’ argument. Even sustained immigration will not fully offset Europe’s natural population decline. Migration can ‘ease the pace’ of ageing but cannot alter its trajectory: migrants also grow old, while their fertility rates tend to converge with those of the host society, although this convergence is slow.
The Overlooked Cost of Labour Migration
The report and the EUobserver article presenting it treat labour migration as an inevitability in tackling the demographic crisis most Western nations face. However, both fail to present the—in many cases, much more—negative impacts on the economy and social welfare system, which, as shown by the grave demographic estimates, are already under heavy pressure.
The Centre for Policy Studies’ Here to Stay? provides a warning from Britain. More than two million visas issued between January 2021 and June 2024 went to people potentially eligible for indefinite leave to remain after five years. Its central projection suggested that 801,000 could apply for settlement, rising to 1.24 million under different post-pandemic assumptions. The CPS argues that immigration policy has concentrated on arrivals while neglecting who remains permanently and the fiscal consequences of settlement.
Additionally, family reunification is often among the main incentives used by different worker visa schemes to attract third-country immigrants to Europe. It, in fact, works as a multiplier and a route to exponential arrival rates.
As Hungarian Conservative recently reported, in the year to March 2026, Britain issued Skilled Worker visas to 1,029 Pakistani principal applicants—and another 6,155 visas to their dependants. Those 1,029 sponsored jobs therefore generated 7,184 arrivals. Across the Skilled Worker and Health and Care routes, 40,254 principal applicants were accompanied by 70,471 dependants. Germany’s Skilled Immigration Act shows a similar direction: certain workers may now bring parents—and sometimes parents-in-law—as well as spouses and children.
The burden on the state budget is equally grave. A 2026 Home Office analysis estimated the lifetime fiscal contribution of a care worker at minus £36,000 and that of an adult Health and Care dependant at minus £67,000. It projected a combined £9.5 billion lifetime net cost for care workers and adult dependants expected to settle between 2026 and 2030.
The route also became fertile ground for fraud and exploitation. Britain’s borders inspector found that 275 sponsorship certificates were granted to a care home that did not exist, while a company declaring four employees received 1,234 certificates. Migrants arrived burdened by recruitment debt, sometimes discovering that the promised work was non-existent.
‘A 2026 Home Office analysis estimated the lifetime fiscal contribution of a care worker at minus £36,000 and that of an adult Health and Care dependant at minus £67,000’
Similarly, Sweden’s National Audit Office warned in February that defective work-permit checks increased the risks of exploitation, unfair competition, and work-related crime. Permits were still issued to employers previously deemed unscrupulous, while post-approval controls were weak. Stockholm proposed new offences for exploiting foreign labour and trading in work permits.
The Dutch government has likewise documented underpayment, unsafe work, substandard tied housing, and accumulated debt among migrant workers. Its Roemer task force produced 50 recommendations and warned of a ‘grey area’ between poor employment practices and human trafficking.
Looking at the data, it is clear that Europe’s ageing crisis cannot be taken lightly—in fact, it is one of the most pressing issues of our time. But treating migration as an automatic necessity risks substituting imported labour for higher wages, effective family policy, automation, training, and the mobilization of Europe’s own inactive workforce.
A genuine shortage may justify recruiting a worker. However, it does not justify turning every sponsored vacancy into an open-ended route for family migration, welfare liabilities, and permanent settlement by administrative default.
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