This article was originally published in Vol. 5 No. 4 of our print edition.

Key Conservative Economic Policymakers in the Visegrad Group

The collapse of state socialist systems in Central Europe paved the way for the emergence and testing of alternative political views in free elections. Disillusionment with the arbitrary politics of the former ruling state party in previous years brought conservative political forces to power in several countries of the Visegrad Group (V4). However, four and a half decades of communist rule ensured that the conservative parties emerging from the regime change lacked their own national traditions. It was no longer possible to return to the conservative traditions of the interwar period, so Western European conservative politics served as a model for these parties and the majority of voters who rallied around them.

In Poland and Hungary, moderate continental thinking served as a model for conservatives. In Czechoslovakia, and from 1993 in the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus led a movement inspired by the British Conservative Party, and specifically the Thatcherite legacy. However, the legacy of state socialism enabled these trends to be adapted only on a theoretical level. The initial difficulties faced by conservative politics were largely due to the lack of established traditions, which made it difficult to influence social life in terms of values. Nation-building and the establishment of a new economy could only occur within the context of the challenges inherited from socialism.

This caused fundamental problems in formulating economic policy. The question arose as to whether market freedom or social security should take precedence for conservative governments. Alternatively, could both priorities coexist, and if so, how could they be reconciled? Initially, conservatives in the post-communist states of Central Europe provided varying answers to this dilemma. It was not until the 2000s that a new model of governance and political strategy began to emerge on the conservative right, primarily in Hungary and Poland, which I shall refer to as the ‘new right’.

Neoliberal interventions in economic policy typically followed regime changes in various countries, according to prevailing narratives in political and economic history.¹ These interventions included the liberalization of prices, market deregulation, the withdrawal of state subsidies, and some form of privatization. If this is indeed the case, conservative political forces undoubtedly had a significant role to play here. This conclusion holds true despite the fact that the introduction of neoliberal economic policies is largely attributed to technocratic reformist groups within the late communist parties.²

Consequently, an even more fundamental question arises: who were the individuals who had the greatest influence on the development of economic policy in conservative governments? What was their social and educational background? What became of them in the later history of democracy? Are the same individuals, or a different generation, directing the economic policies of the ‘new right’ that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s? We investigate these questions by comparing economic policymakers in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, with a specific focus on the generations of conservative government decision-makers over the last 35 years.³

Strategic Positions

In the political governance of the Visegrad Group, (1) prime ministers occupy key decision-making roles in economic policy.⁴ This indicates also that they collaborate with the ministers in charge of particular areas and sectors within the cabinet regarding economic policy decisions. Finance ministers, tasked with overseeing budgetary policy in its entirety, hold a significant position alongside prime ministers. (2) Finance ministers possess a form of quasi-veto authority regarding specific decisions that affect the budget. (3) In the wake of the economic transformation in the region following the state socialist era, the significance of the minister of economic affairs has grown, as this individual oversees competition policy, structural policies, regional policy, and key innovation programmes.⁵

Thus, an inner circle⁶ can be identified within the governments of the V4 countries, composed of the prime minister, the finance minister, and the minister for economic affairs. This group has played a decisive role in the economic transformations of Eastern Europe and in shaping economic policy during the often crisis-ridden period following EU accession. This inner circle functions as a collaborative government unit, although hierarchical relationships are also present.⁷ At the top of this hierarchy is the prime minister, whose responsibilities include shaping economic policy, fostering cooperation, and negotiating appropriate compromises. The finance minister possesses the authority to approve or reject specific budgetary policy measures, which can sometimes lead to the finance minister’s resignation if this quasi-veto power hampers the prime minister’s ability to achieve a compromise. The minister of economy wields less influence over general economic policy decisions but plays a crucial role as an initiator in overseeing certain sectors and in formulating economic strategy.

‘The conservative generation aimed to emulate Western European models, often paving the way for neoliberal shock therapy’

The monetary council, (4) led by central bank governors or presidents, plays a crucial role in monetary policy decisions alongside the abovementioned inner circle of economic policymakers. The political changes of 1989–1990 initiated a transformation of the financial system in the region. In the countries examined, central bank laws ensured the sovereignty of monetary policy, which held symbolic significance, particularly for these newly independent states. Conversely, the early regulation of central banks established their independence from government influence. This independence allowed central banks to adopt both proactive and reactive approaches to economic policy situations and guidelines, generally aligning with government policy and occasionally collaborating closely with the government to achieve economic policy objectives.⁸

In a parliamentary democracy, the prime minister, finance minister, minister for economic affairs, and central bank governor play crucial roles in shaping economic policy. This economic policy quartet is noteworthy due to their positions and the distinctive characteristics of their political institutions. I identified a total of 216 economic policy leaders across four countries from 1989 to 2025. From Czechoslovakia, I included two prime ministers, two finance ministers, two economic ministers, and one central bank governor in the database for the period from December 1989 to 1 January 1993. In the Czech Republic, from 1993 to 2025, there were 13 prime ministers, 14 finance ministers, 22 economic ministers, and 6 central bank governors. In Poland, since the establishment of the Mazowiecki government in September 1989, there have been 16 prime ministers, 25 finance ministers, 25 economic ministers, and 9 central bank governors. From 1990 to 2025, Hungary had 7 prime ministers, 14 finance ministers, 16 economic ministers, and 7 central bank governors. Lastly, from 1 January 1993 to 2025, Slovakia had 9 prime ministers, 14 finance ministers, 25 economic ministers, and 5 central bank governors. The total number of 216 is lower than the sum of the officials listed because some individuals held multiple positions over the past three and a half decades. Specifically, 15 individuals held two positions, and two held three positions within the designated group of economic policy leaders. Of these, we will now examine the key economic policymakers of the conservative governments.

The Heterogeneity of the First Generation

Three decades ago, Hungarian society was shaken by the ‘stabilization package’ introduced by the left-liberal government, which was dubbed, in political slang and the press, the ‘Bokros Package’ after the finance minister at the time. The austerity measures were announced in the spring of 1995 by the prime minister, together with the finance minister and the president of the national bank.⁹ During the mid-1990s, Hungary was not the only economy in the region that required macroeconomic stabilization policies. A few years later, similar stabilization packages were introduced in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and finally Poland.

In the Czech Republic, the external imbalance and monetary crisis could not be resolved by a political leadership that had been in power for years and was committed to free market economic development. The minister of economic affairs, the minister of finance, and the governor of the Central Bank all resigned from their positions. In early elections, Prime Minister Václav Klaus also lost.¹⁰ In Slovakia, which was late to embark on liberalization and privatization and followed a unique path, Mikuláš Dzurinda and Brigita Schmögnerová, the finance minister, who became known as Slovakia’s ‘iron lady’, took over crisis management after Vladimír Mečiar’s fall.¹¹ In 2001, Poland, struggling with high unemployment and external debt, introduced a stabilization and austerity package led by left-wing Leszek Miller in alliance with Finance Minister Marek Belka. Leszek Balcerowicz, the architect of Poland’s shock therapy, became president of the Central Bank. Balcerowicz’s strict monetary policy and the aforementioned fiscal and structural programmes led to solid growth in the early 2000s.¹² These stabilization programmes were implemented by left-wing governments and economic policymakers aligned with the left-liberal political camp. This scenario holds true even in Slovakia, where, during the first government of Christian Democrat Dzurinda, the finance ministry was headed by a representative from the Democratic Left Party, the largest coalition partner.

The claim that left-wing stabilization programmes were required due to the economic policy mistakes of the previous conservative governments is overly simplistic. In Poland, the economic liberalization that began in 1990 was primarily implemented according to the Balcerowicz Plan. The grand coalition government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki drew its main strength from Solidarity, with both the prime minister and the finance minister hailing from this political formation. However, Solidarity’s rise to power was quickly followed by internal divisions within the movement, which enabled the left to regain power. Consequently, it is questionable whether the initial years of Polish democracy can be characterized as conservative governance, given that conservatives had only a limited influence on economic policy. The return of the right wing, which had solidified by 1997 into a centre-right coalition, can be viewed as a more conservative government.¹³ Leszek Balcerowicz resumed his role as the liberal figure within Jerzy Buzek’s coalition government. After the coalition disbanded, two individuals alternated in leading the Ministry of Finance in Buzek’s minority government. In contrast, Janusz Steinhoff consistently led the Ministry of Economic Affairs; he was in his early fifties and had previously served as deputy prime minister during the minority government. Like Buzek, Steinhoff entered the government as an engineer who had graduated from the Silesian University of Technology. Both he and Buzek, who was a few years older, had not been members of the communist state party prior to their government roles. In contrast to Balcerowicz, who had been a member of the Communist Party from 1969 to 1981, Steinhoff obtained his degree in economics from the Central School of Planning and Statistics, a path similar to that of other left-wing economic politicians, before becoming an economic adviser to Solidarity.

While in Poland and Slovakia, the economic policies of conservative-led, centre-right governments were influenced by strong finance ministers, regardless of whether they were from the liberal or reformist left, in Hungary and the Czech Republic, the dynamics of the coalitions allowed prime ministers’ ideas to prevail in centre-right governments. However, the outcomes in these two countries were markedly different. In Hungary, several economic reforms had already been implemented prior to the 1990 elections that resulted in regime change, allowing the country to avoid a shock transformation. The reforms were primarily carried out by a late socialist technocratic elite, even after they returned to power as social democrats in the subsequent political cycle. This raises the question: what economic policy options remained for the first freely elected government?

In the administrations led by József Antall and, following his death, Péter Boross, three finance ministers and three ministers for economic affairs took turns in office. The first finance minister, Ferenc Rabár, was an independent, while his successors, Mihály Kupa and Iván Szabó, were affiliated with the prime minister’s party. A similar trend was observed in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, where the first two ministers, Péter Ákos Bod and Iván Szabó, were members of the leading coalition party, followed by János Latorcai, a candidate from the Christian Democratic coalition partner. Furthermore, from December 1991 to December 1994, the Hungarian National Bank was also led by a member of the ruling party, Péter Ákos Bod. This pattern indicates that economic policymakers with ties to the conservative government frequently transitioned between various posts (notably Szabó and Bod), making them significant figures in shaping economic policy. Like the prime ministers, the ministers and deputy prime ministers had not previously been affiliated with the Communist Party, and most held degrees in economics; however, this was not a strict requirement, as one member was an engineer. Thus, it appears that the economic policy quartet formed a politically cohesive and effective alliance. Additionally, there was an ideological foundation for Hungary’s conservative economic governance, which largely adhered to the ‘third way’ of the post-Second World War era and the German model of a social market economy.¹⁴

This was in contrast to the Czech model, which adhered to a more radical free market approach.¹⁵ In the 1990s, Czech economic policy was influenced by Milton Friedman’s economic theories and Margaret Thatcher’s political ideology, as represented by Václav Klaus.¹⁶ Klaus became the finance minister in the coalition Čalfa government following the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in 1989. In his first year, they developed a Czech (Slovak) adaptation of economic shock therapy, characterized by price liberalization, market deregulation, and the practical implementation of voucher privatization. The liberalization package took effect at the beginning of 1991. In the summer of 1992, Klaus became the prime minister of the Czech portion of the Czechoslovak federation. He was appointed prime minister of the newly independent Czech Republic at the start of 1993, a position he held for the next five years. This period in the 1990s proved to be crucial, despite its shortcomings, for the development of Czech capitalism.¹⁷

Klaus established stable partnerships in key economic policy positions to help guide this process. Jan Klák, a former deputy who succeeded him as Czechoslovak finance minister, returned as deputy finance minister in the independent Czech Republic. Ivan Kočárník, from Klaus’s party, became finance minister but was replaced in the summer of 1997 by Ivan Pilip, who also remained during Klaus’s tenure and was a member of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The position of minister for economic affairs was held by Vladimír Dlouhý, who had previously served as minister of industry and trade in Czechoslovakia. Until the summer of 1996, the Czech minister of economy was Karel Dyba from the ODS, who was succeeded by two Christian Democrat politicians until the summer of 1998. The team demonstrated unity, as its key members (Klaus, Klák, Kočárník, and Dyba) were born in the first half of the 1940s, held degrees in economics, and had graduated from the Prague University of Economics and Business. The situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that, with the exception of Klaus, several of them were members of the Czechoslovak state party at some point during the 1980s.¹⁸

The ‘New Right’ and the Second Generation

The emergence of the ‘new right’ represents, on the one hand, a generational shift and, on the other hand, a cultural and image- driven renewal of conservative governance, as demonstrated by the examples of Poland and Hungary. The limited prominence of this ‘new right’ wave in the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be attributed primarily to the specific political structures and dynamics present in those countries. The influence of the Fidesz Party in Hungary and the PiS Party in Poland can be associated with the power ambitions of a party that began as left-wing in Slovakia and initially liberal in the Czech Republic. In response, conservative or centre-right forces in both of these countries oppose these parties and work together to form coalitions aimed at changing the government.

‘The “new right” in Central Europe, formulated its approach based on the adverse effects of post-transition capitalism and advocated state intervention’

The emergence of the ‘new right’ can be traced back to the 2000s, though it faced numerous failures during that decade. Two key aspects warrant attention. First, NATO and EU accession transformed political perceptions within post-communist countries. The focus shifted from merely imitating the Western model to identifying their place within the Western political framework. Second, it became evident that the world was riddled with crises that could only be addressed at the national level, rather than by passively following the lead of others. This underscored the critical need to enhance national and regional competitiveness, reassess their roles in global trade, and emphasize strategic sectors, not only culturally but also economically.

The initial indications of this change emerged in Hungary on the right, specifically through the actions of Viktor Orbán’s first coalition government. Although this period was still transitional regarding the evolution of new conservative politics, the advocates of Orbán’s economic policies had already begun to take centre stage. With the commencement of Orbán’s second government, they established the direction for the ensuing decade and a half.¹⁹ The finance ministers of the first Orbán government represent two distinct generations. Zsigmond Járai, born in the early 1950s, served as deputy finance minister at the end of the 1980s, where he was responsible for banking supervision. In the 1990s, he transitioned to the private sector. Prior to his appointment as finance minister, he held the position of president of the Budapest Stock Exchange. After serving two and a half years as minister, he became president of the Hungarian National Bank. His successor, Mihály Varga, is from the prime minister’s generation, having been born in the mid-1960s. Varga has been involved in party politics since 1988 and has served as an economic expert for Fidesz since its inception. He returned to the ministry during Orbán’s second term, acting as head of the merged Ministry of National Economy from 2013 to 2018, and then resumed his role as finance minister from 2018 to 2024. Since March 2025, he has served as the president of the Hungarian National Bank. The changes in the ministers of economy during Orbán’s first government are noteworthy. Attila Chikán, an academic born in the mid-1940s, was succeeded by György Matolcsy. Matolcsy, born in the mid-1950s, was part of a group of technocrats who had established significant careers since the late socialist era and maintained the idea of reform even after the collapse of state socialism. He served as head of the Ministry of National Economy during the second Orbán government (2010–2013) and later became president of the National Bank, a position he held for just over a decade.²⁰

This brief description highlights the way in which, since the turn of the millennium, the economic policy associated with Viktor Orbán has primarily centred on two economic policymakers. However, in the past three years, the situation has evolved with the emergence of a new figure, Márton Nagy, representing the generation born in the mid-1970s. Nagy, who serves as the prime minister’s adviser, advanced through the ranks from his role as deputy governor of the Hungarian National Bank under György Matolcsy. He initially led the Ministry of Economic Development from 2022 to 2024 and subsequently took charge of the Ministry of National Economy starting in 2024. Matolcsy’s exit from the system suggests that Nagy’s influence on economic policy decisions is on the verge of becoming fully realized.²¹

A different situation has emerged in Poland, characterized by a less centralized approach to economic policy. However, the presence of prominent figures from the ‘new right’ can still be observed. A strengthening conservative party emerged largely due to the turmoil of political transition, social tensions during liberalization, and the inability to address unemployment. The PiS Party, established in 2001, adopted a strong conservative stance within a few years and gained power in the 2005 elections. The strengthening conservative party was largely brought to life by the turmoil of political transition, social tensions during liberalization, and the failure to resolve unemployment. Within a few years of its formation in 2001, PiS underwent a strong conservative shift and emerged victorious in the 2005 elections. The first government, led first by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, who was unknown in politics, and then by party leader Jarosław Kaczyński, did not bring about a resounding political success. The two governments, first led by the politically unknown Marcinkiewicz and later by party leader Kaczyński, did not achieve significant political success. During the two years of government, four finance ministers came and went. Zyta Gilowska served in both prime ministers’ cabinets, having left her position as deputy chair of the rival Civic Platform Party in May 2005 due to internal party disputes. Like the other finance ministers in the PiS government from 2005 to 2007, Gilowska participated as an expert from outside the party. Accusations of her collaboration with the former communist secret police led to her resignation. In September 2006, Gilowska rejoined the Kaczyński government, leading the ministry for more than a year. In addition to her role as deputy prime minister, she also became the president of the European Investment Bank in Poland. Geologist Piotr Woźniak served as minister for economic affairs in both PiS governments. From 2011 to 2013, during Donald Tusk’s government, he served as undersecretary of state at the Ministry of the Environment, and since 2016, he has been the chairman of the management board of the Polish Oil and Gas Company.²²

In 2015, PiS returned to power, leading to the tenures of two prime ministers, Beata Szydło and Mateusz Morawiecki, who both achieved significant results in economic policy. While it is widely recognized that party leader Lech Kaczyński had a major influence on the government during this time, it is primarily Morawiecki’s rise and his emergence as a pivotal figure in economic policy that is most notable.²³ Born in 1968, Morawiecki graduated from the University of Wrocław with a degree in history and from the Wrocław University of Economics with a degree in economics. After studying at Western universities, he taught at Wrocław University of Economics, and worked in the banking sector starting in the late 1990s. He became involved in politics at an early age and grew up with anti-communist sentiments. However, despite his evident support for Solidarity, he did not engage in party politics until the mid-2010s. In Szydło’s government, he initially led the development ministry and served as deputy prime minister, later being appointed to the finance ministry in September 2016. During this time, he became a member of PiS and is now viewed as the successor to Kaczyński. Following the conflict between Kaczyński and Szydło, Morawiecki succeeded in forming a government, initially retaining his ministerial roles and then, starting in January 2018, establishing new leadership for those ministries. Concurrently, there were changes in the leadership of the National Bank of Poland, with former left-wing Prime Minister and Finance Minister Marek Belka being succeeded by Adam Glapiński after six years. Glapiński had previously served as an economic advisor to President Lech Kaczyński, who died in a plane crash in 2010. In October 2019, PiS achieved the greatest electoral success in its history, emerging as the leading force in a right-wing electoral coalition. This, combined with the recovery of the Polish economy, bolstered Morawiecki’s position. Throughout Morawiecki’s tenure, there have been six finance ministers and an equal number of ministers for economic affairs. A generational shift is occurring among finance ministers, with those born in the 1950s (Marian Banaś, Jerzy Kwieciński, and Tadeusz Kościński) being replaced by economists born in the 1970s who were socialized in a democratic environment (Teresa Czerwińska, Magdalena Rzeczkowska, and Andrzej Kosztowniak). The most notable finance minister during this period is Tadeusz Kościński, who was born in London and previously served as undersecretary in the ministries led by Morawiecki. In his two years and two months as finance minister, he also held the position of minister of funds and regional policy for one year. His downfall occurred when his proposed tax reform was rejected. The generational shift among economic ministers was particularly significant. Individuals born in the early 1980s had begun to emerge in these roles. Those leading these ministries came from diverse educational backgrounds, including engineering, political science, philosophy, economics, law, and education. Additionally, under Morawiecki’s government, they also occupied roles in other ministries as ministers, state secretaries, or undersecretaries.²⁴

The failure of Morawiecki and PiS in the coalition talks following the 2023 elections was not due to the state of the Polish economy, despite the presence of structural problems within it. Unlike neoliberal economic policies, the conservative protectionist social policy developed from the 2000s prioritizes national economic interests and includes protectionist elements. For a significant portion of Polish society, the institutional integrity of liberal democracy and the principle of the rule of law were prioritized over economic conditions in the 2023 elections.²⁵

Conclusion

The history of conservative economic governance remains an ongoing narrative. As we have illustrated, it is currently in its second phase. In the first phase, immediately following the regime change, the conservative generation aimed to emulate Western European models, often paving the way for neoliberal shock therapy. The second generation, referred to as the ‘new right’ in Central Europe, formulated its approach based on the adverse effects of post-transition capitalism, including unemployment, public sector downsizing, and privatization, along with lessons gleaned from prior crises. Economically, this generation represented a departure from the principles of classical economic liberalism, advocating instead for state organization and intervention, the fortification of national capital, and a welfare-protectionist stance. This shift coincided with a centralization of government, which viewed national economic policy not through the lens of independent economic experts, but through coordinated political and economic action. While this philosophy often resulted in policies that were at odds with mainstream economics, it consistently received support from voters.

Economic governance always takes shape through a specific combination of individuals, influenced not only by ideology but also by political background, party affiliation, coalition relations, personal ambition, and political character. Characteristic conservative economic policies, such as Klaus’s free market aspirations and the state- and politics-centred approaches of Orbán and Morawiecki, are shaped by the unique circumstances surrounding these individuals.

The study was supported by the EKÖP-24-4-II-145 (The Collective Nature of Political Leadership) University Research Fellowship Programme of the Ministry for Culture and Innovation from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.

NOTES

1 See Hillary Appel, and Mitchell A. Orenstein. From Triumph to Crisis: Neoliberal Economic Reform in Postcommunist Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

2 Johanna Bockmann, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism (Stanford University Press, 2011).

3 This article is based on a collective biography research examining the social background and career paths of economic policymakers in the post- communist region. I gathered information from government websites and current news sources to compile biographical data. This database is based on the comprehensive collection of data created by the University of Nottingham’s Party Systems and Governments Observatory project. For more details, see: F. Casal Bértoa, ‘Database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond’, PSGo (2025), whogoverns.eu.

4 This is also applicable to Poland, which is characterized as a semi-presidential system. Among the V4 countries, the Polish president wields the most substantial influence over the functioning of the state and the political system. He has the authority to obstruct and shape the government by vetoing personnel decisions and legislation. Meanwhile, similarly to the other V4 nations, the prime minister plays a crucial role in formulating economic policy in Poland.

5 In the article, I use the term ‘minister for economic affairs’ to include those ministers who were most closely aligned with this area of responsibility at the time. Consequently, this category encompasses ministers of industry, development, regional development, and others, in addition to ministers specifically designated as economics ministers.

6 Peter Hennessy uses the British example of the inner circle to illustrate this category of government. Rodney Rhodes adopts this concept in the methodological introduction to their latest book on cabinet government, such as the concept of ‘court government’. Patrick Weller, Denis C. Grube, and R.A.W. Rhodes, Comparing Cabinets: Dilemmas of Collective Government (Oxford University Press, 2021).

7 The two types of cabinet described in Rudi Andeweg’s classic study are particularly relevant here. The first is the ‘overlord system’, which stems from Churchill’s experience as prime minister in the early 1950s. In these cabinets, there exists an inner circle where members oversee the work of various departmental ministers. Andeweg’s second relevant model is the ‘cabinet with an inner circle’, where the decision-making process involves all ministers. However, considerable influence is not solely held by the prime minister but is also shared by two or more senior ministers. Rudi Andeweg, ‘A Model of the Cabinet System: The Dimension of Cabinet Decision-Making Processes’, in Jean Blondel, and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds, Governing Together: The Extentand Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets (Palgrave 1993), 32–38.

8 The role of central bank governors has noticeably weakened since Slovakia adopted the euro in 2009.

9 Cz. I., ‘Egyensúlyt és növekedést ígér az új pénzügyi-gazdasági trió’ [New financial- economic trio promises balance and growth], Népszabadság, 53/52 (1995), 1, 4. For an assessment of austerity measures in economic policy, see János Kornai, ‘Adjustment without Recession: A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilization’, in Salvatore Zecchini, ed., Lessons from the Economic Transition (Springer, 1997), 123–151.

10 Eva Zamrazilová, and Liana Payson, ‘External Imbalance: The Czech Case’, Eastern European Economics, 38/3 (2000), 82–94.

11 Katarína Mathernová, and Juraj Renčko, ‘“Reformology”: The Case of Slovakia’, Orbis, 5/4, 629–640; Sharon Fisher, John Gould, and Tim Haughton, ‘Slovakia’s Neoliberal Turn’, Europe–Asia Studies, 59/6 (2007), 977–998; Peter Adamovsky, ‘The Iron Lady of Slovakia’, The Slovak Spectator (2019), https://spectator.sme.sk/business/c/ the-iron-lady-of-slovakia.

12 Przemysław Pluciński, ‘Debt and Crisis: Socio-Economic Critique of Neoliberal Transformation in Poland’, The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 31/ 2, (2020), 211–229.

13 For more on the consolidation of Solidarity camp in the context of Polish democratic development, see: Andrzej Friszke, and Antoni Dudek, Geschichte Polens 1939–2015 (A History of Poland 1939–2015) (Brill, 2022), 589–600.

14 Otto Hieronymi, ‘Regime Change in Hungary: The Economic Policies of the Antall Government’, Hungarian Review, 4/4 (2013), 36–47.

15 Libor Žídek, From Central Planning to the Market: The Transformation of the Czech Economy 1989–2004. (CEU Press, 2017), 67–134.

16 Seán Hanley, ‘The New Right in the New Europe? Unravelling the Ideology of “Czech Thatcherism”’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4/ 2 (1999), 183–189.

17 For Klaus’s political profile, see Jiří Pehe, Klaus: Portrét politika ve dvaceti obra [Klaus: A Portrait of a Politician in Twenty Images] (Prostor, 2010).

18 Seán Hanley, The New Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics, 1989–2006 (Routledge, 2007), 78–112.

19 Marcin A. Piasecki, ‘Was Viktor Orbán’s Unorthodox Economic Policy the Right Answer to Hungary’s Economic Misfortunes?’, International Journal of Management and Economics, 46/1 (2015), 47–71.

20 For biographies, see ‘Curriculum Vitae of György Matolcsy’, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2025), www.mnb.hu/en/the-central-bank/management-and-control-of-the-mnb/management-of-mnb/curriculum-vitae-of-gyorgy-matolcsy; and ‘Curriculum Vitae of Mihály Varga’, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2025), www.mnb.hu/en/the-central-bank/management-and-control-of-the-mnb/management-of-mnb/ curriculum-vitae-of-mihaly-varga. On the role of Hungarian central bank governors, see Miklós Sebők, Kristin Makszin, and Jasper Simons, ‘Mission Adapted: The Hidden Role of Governors in Shaping Central Bank Operating Missions in Hungary’, East European Politics, 38/1 (2022), 101–122.

21 ‘Curriculum Vitae of Márton Nagy’, European Investment Bank (2024), www.eib.org/files/documents/cv-marton-nagy.en.pdf. On the economic policy of Nagy, see Ádám Bráder, ‘Minister for National Economy: 2025 Is Hungary’s Economic Breakthrough Year’, Hungarian Conservative, www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/hungary-economy-2025-outlook-breaktrough/.

22 Marek Naczyk, ‘Taking back control: comprador bankers and managerial developmentalism in Poland’, Review of International Political Economy, 29/5 (2022) 1650–1674.

23 For context, see Maciej Wysocki, Cezary Wojcik, and Andreas Freytag, ‘Populists and Fiscal Policy: The Case of Poland’, European Journal of Political Economy, 83/3 (2024).

24 Leszek Balcerowicz et al., ‘Are Populists Good for Growth? The Effects of the Populist Regime in Poland, 2016–2023’, Eastern European Economics, www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00128775.2025.2580200?src=.

25 Radoslaw Markowski, ‘The Polish Election of 2023: Mobilisation in Defence of Liberal Democracy’, West European Politics, 47/7 (2024), 1670–1685.

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