Damjan Krnjević Mišković is a Serbian foreign policy analyst and commentator with extensive experience in diplomacy, academia, and publishing. A former senior official in the Serbian government and editor at World Affairs Journal, he has written widely on geopolitics, energy security, and the role of the Balkans and the Caucasus in global affairs. Mr Mišković was a distinguished speaker at the 5th Geopolitical Summit, co-organized by the Danube Institute and the Heritage Foundation. On the sidelines of the conference, he spoke with Hungarian Conservative about the US-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement, Washington’s new foothold in the Silk Road region, and the opportunities this presents for Hungary.
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On 8 August, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace agreement in Washington, bringing an end to more than 30 years of conflict in the South Caucasus. What does this agreement mean for each of the parties involved—for Armenia, for Azerbaijan, and for the United States?
I think the most significant thing from the perspective of the United States is that this is the first time ever that a US President, in the White House, has personally hosted an event of this level around the Armenia–Azerbaijan settlement. It shows the Trump administration understood it could do something no other external actor could do—including none of his American predecessors.
Part of that is the way the Americans conceptualized their value-add: transforming a geopolitical bottleneck—this sliver of a corridor, what used to be called the Zangezur corridor and what is now tied to the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’ (TRIPP)—by shifting the emphasis onto a commercial foundation. That worked for everyone: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States. That commercial logic is part of the overall peace framework, though not integral to the treaty text itself.
The peace deal—the treaty text—was agreed without a heavy American push. There were various rounds; some took place in the US, others elsewhere. But, in the end, the agreement on the text was forged by the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, and the text was finalized months ago. The idea then was to have a public event that would ‘lock in’ that text. The substance had already been agreed; the symbolism is a fundamentally political act. Combine that with the logic behind the TRIPP agreement—technically a bilateral deal between Armenia and the United States, but with clear Azerbaijani buy-in (and at least implicit acceptance by several others)—and it suggests everyone was comfortable enough to have an outside power hold the ‘umbrella’ over this agreement. Of all the alternatives, the American umbrella was the one both Armenians and Azerbaijanis were most comfortable with.
So what does the United States gain? Washington gains a foothold in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, in what I call the Silk Road region—the South Caucasus plus Central Asia, which conceptually is one space. The US has acquired a kind of foothold it never had before. This is predicated on recognizing something that should have been obvious: Azerbaijan is the big prize, not Armenia. Zbigniew Brzezinski said in 1997 that Azerbaijan is the cork in the bottle for unlocking the riches of the Caspian and Central Asia. In practice, Azerbaijan is the indispensable state for advancing any external power’s connectivity ambitions, given today’s geopolitical realities and sanctions on Russia and Iran. If you want to go West–East or East–West, you cannot avoid Azerbaijan.
‘If the US wants to advance its interests in this region, it needs a relationship with Azerbaijan on new terms’
The US has positioned itself as indirectly responsible for the good functioning of the new agreement. I say ‘indirectly’ because there are no US security guarantees. In essence, the TRIPP piece is an agreement for the United States to lease rights to administer customs and border controls according to Armenian law—and then for the US side to lease this out to a private company, probably an American one. Practically, this delivers what Azerbaijan sought: the ability for goods, services and people to transit between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan without physical interference by Armenian authorities.
Armenian concerns are addressed because all of this operates under Armenian law. The way to square the circle was to turn a geopolitical conundrum into a commercial enterprise. Crucially, the Americans accomplished this without making binding commitments involving troops on the ground. Everyone understood that would be a step too far and would further inflame parts of Iranian and Russian decision-making circles. So a balance was struck. Whether it proves sufficient will become clear in the months and years ahead, because this still needs to be financed and built.
What did Armenia gain? Essentially, a necessary ticket to overcome its geopolitical and geoeconomic isolation. Given the strength of the Azerbaijan–Türkiye alliance, everyone understood the sequencing: first Armenia makes peace with Azerbaijan; that then opens the door to peace with Türkiye. Prime Minister Pashinyan understood this and did what he deemed necessary.
There were additional White House outcomes: several bilateral US–Armenia agreements (not only TRIPP) in IT and economic development, and US–Azerbaijan documents—notably, agreement to set up a working group to draft a Strategic Partnership text within about six months. That is fundamentally important: it underscores that the Trump administration, unlike previous US administrations, grasped that the geostrategic and geoeconomic prize for Washington in the South Caucasus and into Central Asia is Azerbaijan, not Armenia. Credit to the Trump team for not accepting inherited State Department dogma and the ‘Armenia-first’ narrative shaped by certain partisan and lobbying interests. It’s not about putting Armenia in a corner; Armenia has a role. But Azerbaijan is the keystone state. If the US wants to advance its interests in this region, it needs a relationship with Azerbaijan on new terms—hence the forthcoming Strategic Partnership.
Within six months there will likely be another high-level event to sign the Strategic Partnership agreement. There will be a series of TRIPP-related milestones: choosing the company, financing, build-out, on-site steps in Armenia and the South Caucasus. Each milestone is substantial enough for presidential-level involvement—which, frankly, aligns with President Trump’s interest in a Nobel Peace Prize package. The more follow-up, the more credible the peace process—and the more incentive for continued US engagement.
Doesn’t such significant US involvement in the region raise concerns for other powers, such as Russia or Iran?
Challenges, of course, remain. The Russian reaction was less negative than expected. Iranian reactions varied; rhetoric was not uniform, so one must parse who speaks for whom. My bottom line: Tehran has set multiple rhetorical markers so it can later point to whichever line suits the policy it ultimately pursues.
I don’t think this can be ‘killed’. TRIPP operates under Armenian law. Unless Armenia sanctions Russia—highly unlikely—Russian firms can use TRIPP. In connectivity terms, that is actually good for Russia while northern routes remain sanctioned. For Iran it’s more complicated: Azerbaijani mainland–Nakhchivan transit has looped through Iran, which brought modest benefits that would diminish if TRIPP opens. But there are ways for Azerbaijan, Türkiye and others to compensate Iran. A key element is Iran’s genuine, decades-long strategic partnership with Armenia. Part of Yerevan’s task is to ensure Tehran understands that the American presence is commercial, not official. Since this is the plan anyway, it should eventually be acceptable to Iran, even if it is non-linear.
Because TRIPP is under Armenian law, there’s no reason any country—including China—cannot use it. Over time, this route could become as important as, or even more important than, the Georgian route. If the Middle Corridor really takes off, volumes will support both. A necessary component is modernizing Nakhchivan’s road and rail links; financing and execution still need to be worked out. Azerbaijan can fund much itself, but there is interest in seeing whether the European Union will co-finance. If Brussels helps, it shows recognition of the project’s strategic importance despite having had little to do with the final stage culminating in the White House meeting. If it does not, Baku and Yerevan will read that accordingly.
You have described Azerbaijan as a gateway to the wider Silk Road region in Central Asia. In that context, how do you think China might respond to what appears to be growing US influence in the region, particularly concerning rare earths and critical minerals?
The Chinese are generally comfortable with competition; they tend to believe they can win most contests—which in Central Asia has often been true. What they would object to is a security component reminiscent of post-9/11 US basing and military cooperation, which later faded. If something like that returned—and the only plausible pretext would be China—Beijing would react negatively. I don’t think that is going to happen.
China’s clear interest is maintaining maximal control over extraction and processing of critical minerals. The interest of Central Asian and South Caucasus states is to capture more value—higher prices per tonne and, where feasible, local processing. If the US seriously enters this space, the issue ceases to be purely commercial. Central Asian states will need to balance offers carefully to protect sovereignty and security while maximizing economic benefit. That will evolve over time.
Back to the corridor: there will be infrastructure development and new rail routes. What role could Hungary and Hungarian companies play in this reconstruction and reintegration of the region?
In the TRIPP corridor itself—roughly 40–42 kilometres—probably not much, because whoever wins that concession will, in one way or another, be affiliated with the United States. But beyond that, Hungarians have played a not insignificant role in rebuilding Karabakh, and Hungarian trade and investment in Azerbaijan have grown year by year. A Hungarian company operates in the Alat Free Economic Zone, for example. Hungarian business is known, accepted and welcomed in Azerbaijan—and likewise in several Central Asian states. This is not only because Hungary is an Observer in the Organization of Turkic States, but also because Hungary has no negative legacy in the region, no imperial baggage, and no ambitions to carve out a sphere of influence. Political relations are positive.
Hungary should prioritize the projects where its firms can add the most value and communicate those priorities—particularly to Azerbaijan. I would expect openness on Baku’s side. Hungary should position its companies to benefit from the new connectivity trend; the door is likely more open to Hungary than to many other EU member states.
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