The following is an adaptation of an article written by Laura Nyilas, a research fellow at the Europe Strategy Institute of the University of Public Service, originally published on the Five Minutes Europe blog of Ludovika.hu.
January 2026 brought many surprises, as we witnessed international events that confirmed that active participation in the global discourse on international security and defence policy is a key priority for Europe. The Munich Security Conference, which will take place on 13–15 February 2026, provides an excellent opportunity for this, with discussions on European security and defence, the future of transatlantic relations, the revival of multilateralism, competing visions of the global order, regional conflicts, and the security implications of technological developments, taking into account the US Vice President’s 2025 speech, which came as a surprise to many. Before the event, it is worth reviewing the most important issues.
Global security challenges and the question of Europe’s role in the world are recurring themes. However, in February this year, one of the most pressing issues in relation to European defence is likely to be how quickly and effectively it can be strengthened independently, and at what political cost.
Europe finds itself in a geopolitical situation it has not experienced for a long time. Russia’s war against Ukraine threatens to destroy Ukraine and the familiar European security order, while geo-economic tensions and structural economic weaknesses jeopardize Europe’s prosperity. Meanwhile, internal political and economic tensions are undermining the EU’s credibility and capacity to act.
The pressure on Europe has intensified since the second Trump administration took office. In addition to the challenges posed by changes in the world order, Europe must also face Donald Trump’s threats that the United States will not defend NATO member states that do not meet their financial obligations, thereby raising the long-standing issue of burden sharing within NATO to a whole new level. Europe is therefore in a serious situation in many respects and, in the current circumstances, can be said to be unprepared (even though there have been examples of vocal American dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of financial burdens in previous years) for a situation in which Trump actually and fully carries out his threats.
To date, the EU and its member states have responded by increasing defence spending and developing new economic and security strategies. However, this will not necessarily be enough to stabilize the shaky pillars of the liberal world order on their own.
‘The pressure on Europe has intensified since the second Trump administration took office’
In the field of European defence, we can observe two parallel strategic directions and challenges that Europe is forced to address simultaneously. The first is a short-term strategic direction, which covers the stabilization of Ukraine and the immediate ‘front line’, while the second is a longer-term strategic endeavour to structurally transform Europe’s defence capabilities, as the European security model has been largely based on American security guarantees, the self-evident presence of which has now been called into question. In order for the EU to be able to take appropriate and sustainable long-term measures on both fronts, it must place its defence capabilities on a new footing, which will require a high degree of autonomy and systemic reforms.
Although European defence policy used to be highly fragmented, with EU member states often prioritizing their national security interests over common EU priorities, and companies operating in the defence industry viewing each other as competitors rather than partners, an institutionalized defence industry has begun to emerge (although fragmentation is still often present today).
In recent years, several documents have been produced that aim to remedy the shortcomings of the European defence industry and provide a basis for the EU to move in the right direction towards an independent defence industry. One such document is the White Paper for European Defence, published in March 2025, which sets out a new strategic framework for the European defence industry.
As a result of the White Paper, an action plan to strengthen European security through the European defence industry was adopted in May 2025. Its goal is to provide financial support to member states to accelerate their defence capabilities, enabling urgent and significant investments to support the European defence industry. In December 2025 the Commission adopted the 2026 annual work programme for the European Defence Fund, one of the main objectives of which is to strengthen industrial competitiveness and promote cooperation across Europe.
European security and defence policy is undergoing clear changes, which are necessary and will fundamentally and strategically transform the continent’s situation. In addition to the institutionalized frameworks mentioned above, military spending has also increased significantly in Europe. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, European[1] military spending rose by a total of 17 per cent to $693 billion in 2024, representing an 83 per cent absolute increase compared to 2015. The war between Russia and Ukraine, which will enter its fifth year in 2026, has further increased military spending, and the average level of European military budgets is higher than it was at the end of the Cold War.[2]
‘The European defence industry is also at a turning point’
These figures also point to a turning point, with European security no longer being an option but a system. The European defence industry is also at a turning point. However, there is tension because while the European Commission is striving for deeper, supranational integration and autonomy, the fragmentation and national rivalry that are sometimes observed undermine these efforts in many cases.
The success of EU defence integration—in this case, from the Commission’s point of view—also depends in part on whether it is possible to overcome particular national interests and improve coordination between member states. Without these measures, the current rearmament drive risks allowing the industry’s focus on private profit to override broader, long-term European security and stability interests.
Transforming the EU’s defence industry by incorporating the lessons learned from Ukraine and exploiting the potential of revolutionary technologies and new defence players requires addressing some structural challenges.
The Russian aggression in 2022, followed by Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024 and the accompanying transformation of US security strategy, fundamentally changed Europe’s security outlook. Over the past 10 years, the EU has steadily expanded its role in European defence industrial policy, particularly in the areas of defence research and development and joint procurement.
The reality, however, is that despite the initiatives launched so far, the EU has not yet been able to convince member states that there is real added value for all in increasing Europe’s defence industrial production capacity and in establishing an independent European defence force. In this context, the importance and significance of NATO may be raised, but in the current security policy environment, it is not necessarily a question of a ‘NATO versus EU’ conflict, but rather a new formation based on crisis management through division of labour, meaning that security and defence issues must be addressed at a new level, taking into account who can solve what and how in the most efficient way.
There will therefore be plenty to discuss at the Munich Security Conference between 13 and 15 February, where nearly 50 heads of state and government from around the world have already confirmed their participation, including a large delegation from the German federal government led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
With long-standing alliances being called into question, the rules-based international order fragmenting, uncertainty growing, and conflicts multiplying around the world, this year’s conference is taking place at a fundamental turning point, where we can pay particular attention to discussions on financial and non-financial dilemmas, such as the short time frame for a series of urgent decisions, the possible increase in joint defence programmes, and the improvement of interoperability within the EU.
[1] Europe in the geographical sense.
[2] In Central and Western Europe, military spending rose by 14 per cent to $472 billion in 2024, representing a 59 per cent increase over the decade from 2015 to 2024. In 2024 the United Kingdom increased its military spending by 2.8 per cent to $81.8 billion. In Eastern Europe, military spending rose by 24 per cent to $221 billion in 2024, the highest level since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Military spending in Eastern Europe increased by 164 per cent over the decade from 2015 to 2024. In 2024 Ukraine’s military spending increased by 2.9 per cent to $64.7 billion, accounting for 43 per cent of Russia’s spending and 54 per cent of the Ukrainian government’s total spending for the year. In 2024 North American military spending increased by 5.7 per cent to $1.027 trillion, which was 19 per cent higher than in 2015. China, the world’s second-largest military spender, is estimated to have spent $314 billion on military expenditures in 2024, a 7.0 per cent increase over 2023. This was the largest annual percentage increase in China’s military spending since 2015 and the 30th consecutive year of growth—the longest uninterrupted series recorded for any country in SIPRI’s military expenditure database. Chinese spending rose by 59 per cent in the decade from 2015 to 2024.
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