This article was originally published in Vol. 6 No. 1 of our print edition.

The idea of progress carries the promise of lasting improvement achieved through human reason and will. Consequently, invoking progress confers moral authority on societal movements. History, however, shows that movements considered progressive—such as eugenics, communism, and an excessively fossil-fuel-driven society—have often resulted in catastrophe. This study first examines the general concept of progress and then analyses its ideological form.

The Concept of Progress

The term progress derives from the Latin verb progredi, meaning ‘to move forward’ or ‘to advance’. In its original usage, it simply denoted movement or forward motion. The concept of progression appears across a range of academic disciplines: in mathematics, it refers to an increasing numerical sequence; in medicine, to the worsening course of a disease; and in taxation, to a rate that rises proportionally with income. Despite their differences, these uses share a common theme: the idea of gradual increase.¹

The concept of progress as a secular societal value came to philosophical prominence during the Enlightenment. This conception presupposes that society is capable of consciously improving itself—that is, of transcending its own limitations through self-direction. Progress can be formally defined as ‘a historical process guided by human reason, aimed at achieving lasting improvement in the human condition’. This definition rests on three assumptions: (1) there exists a goal regarded as progressive (telos); (2) this goal is actually realized; and (3) the outcome brings improvement in an objective sense. This ideal-typical form of progress can be expressed as ‘Telos + Realization = Improvement’.² The formal essence of progress can be summarized as a conditional statement: if the telos is realized, improvement follows. This statement is false only if the realization of the goal results in a deterioration in the social condition. The notion of ‘destructive progress’ refers precisely to this scenario.

The primary counterpart to progress is continuity—preserving the status quo. While progress emphasizes change, traditionalism stands for social continuity. In broad terms, progress looks to an imagined future shaped by reason, whereas traditionalism relies on accumulated experience and time-tested practices. In this sense, progress is inherently anti-traditional and, in its newer forms, also increasingly anti-natural. In other words, these newer currents of progress seek to transcend not only tradition but also natural constants such as biological sex, human capabilities, and physical limitations—as exemplified by the ideas of transgenderism and transhumanism. Within progressivist narratives, the more radical the change, the more readily it is hailed as ‘genuine’ progress.

The lasting improvement of social conditions is a formal objective that can be filled with various types of content. Two of the most important of these are economic growth and equality: the former focuses on technology and production, while the latter focuses on distribution. However, progress can also be measured by other parameters, such as life expectancy, the quality of education, energy efficiency, social stability, or sustainability. Assessing a society’s condition requires many different indicators, the majority of which are difficult to quantify and compare. Like most social movements, progress is not uniform: moderate forms aim at improving existing social structures through fine-tuning, while radical forms seek to transform the prevailing order.³ Beyond these forms, progress can also appear as part of radical political ideologies, which will be examined later.

Interpretations of Progress

The idea of progress is one of the central tenets of modernity and is thus deeply embedded in Western thought. It refers both to a normative ideal of betterment and to a historical phenomenon: the observable pattern of change in modern societies. Naively optimistic readings focus mainly on the advances, whereas more realistic or pessimistic interpretations also register decline, violence, and collapse. Consequently, progress is not a uniform concept; it takes shape in many different interpretations and ideological frameworks.

‘Progress can be formally defined as “a historical process guided by human reason, aimed at achieving lasting improvement in the human condition”’

The thinkers of the Enlightenment—such as Condorcet and Voltaire—believed that society could be improved through human reason and science. For them, progress was conceived as a purposeful, linear, and inevitable process, and was typically viewed as finite. Other philosophical traditions—such as those of Kant or Husserl—understood progress as an infinite task. Advocates of cyclical or tragic conceptions of history—like Vico or Nietzsche—challenged the notion of linear advancement. Evolutionary approaches—such as those of Darwin and Hayek—emphasized the organic and unplanned nature of change, while postmodern thinkers—as Lyotard and Foucault—rejected the legitimacy of universal historical narratives altogether.⁴

Within the literature on progress, little attention has been paid to distinguishing progress as intention (telos) from progress as outcome (realization). This is understandable to some extent, as communities need to believe in the success of progressive ideas and in the inevitability of development. Some philosophers argue that history moves toward a teleological goal, whether freedom (Hegel), communism (Marx), or liberal democracy (Fukuyama). According to these thinkers, progress is not only desirable but inevitable. However, the notion of inevitable progress is problematic on several levels. It is ontologically flawed, as neither the validity of the goals nor their realization is guaranteed. It is politically dangerous because it undermines caution and fosters intolerance towards alternative viewpoints. It is also incompatible with classical liberal and democratic values such as freedom of speech, political debate, pluralism, majority decision-making, and popular sovereignty.

‘The only reasonable course is moderate (conservative) progress: gradual reform that seeks improvement while preserving society’s proven institutional and cultural frameworks and taking account of social complexity and local knowledge’

In the dominant progressive narrative, the progressive side represents moral good, while conservative or traditionalist positions are cast as morally bad. Movements seeking moral legitimacy often present themselves as progressive, even when their actual goals contradict the ideals of progress. Colonialism offers a telling example: although rooted in selfishness and ruthlessness, it justified itself in the name of progress by invoking missionary work and the export of ‘civilization’.⁵ The eugenics movement of the early twentieth century likewise illustrates destructive progress: it sought to genetically ‘improve’ the population. As a consequence, tens of thousands of individuals were forcibly sterilized in the United States, while the Third Reich killed between 70,000 and 100,000 people diagnosed with mental illnesses or disabilities.⁶ The Great Irish Famine (1845–1852) provides another instructive case. It was triggered by a potato blight. During this period, the British government simultaneously adhered to protectionist grain laws and to the emerging principles of laissez-faire economics, which were considered progressive at the time. This ideological rigidity and policy failure significantly worsened the situation and ultimately contributed to the death of 1 million people and the emigration of another 1.5 million.⁷

Environmental critiques of economic growth—and thus of modern notions of progress—emerged in the 1970s, most notably with The Limits to Growth. Ronald Wright calls certain innovations—such as irrigation and deforestation—‘progress traps’: developments that bring short-term advantages but ultimately lead to socio-ecological collapse.⁸ A modern example is the drying up of the Aral Sea in Central Asia, where a project aimed at boosting cotton production ultimately resulted in ecological collapse. If the prevailing consensus on climate change is correct, then the fossil-fuel-based Industrial Revolution itself also qualifies as a ‘progress trap’.

The Limits of Social Engineering

A central feature of progress is goal-oriented (teleological) thinking, which is particularly applicable to the engineering sciences for two main reasons. First, the relative simplicity and deterministic behaviour of the physical systems involved allow for accurate modelling. As a result, the desired goals—such as the stability of a bridge or the operation of a machine—can be planned in advance and reliably achieved. Second, engineering goals are typically defined according to objective criteria such as cost-effectiveness, energy efficiency, and safety.

It is therefore tempting to extend this engineering mindset to society itself: if bridges and machines can be designed to function reliably, why should social order not be designed in a similar way. However, shaping society is a far more complex undertaking, and the relevance of a teleological approach is much more limited. The key reasons for this are outlined below:

1. As a material system, society is also subject to the laws of physics. From a thermodynamic perspective, modern society is a highly ordered, low-entropy structure in which disorder (entropy) increases spontaneously, in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics. Counteracting this tendency is a difficult but essential task for any such ordered system. Traditional institutions have proven capable of limiting the growth of entropy and maintaining stability over long periods. New institutions, by contrast, have not yet undergone the same historical testing, so their stabilizing effects are far less certain.
2. Society is a complex, networked, and often chaotic system in which myriad factors—cultural patterns, economic interests, political power structures, and technological innovations—are in constant interaction. This complexity makes it extremely difficult to predict social dynamics.
3. In such a system, social interventions often have non-linear and unpredictable effects. The unintended consequences of well-intentioned reforms may, over time, undermine their original aims. For example, women’s emancipation and employment promote gender equality, which is a positive development, but they also contribute to a significant decline in fertility rates, which is a negative consequence.
4. Social objectives cannot be evaluated by the standards of the natural sciences. There is no universally accepted basis for determining whether equality, freedom, stability, or sustainability should take precedence in policymaking. Goal-setting always occurs at the intersection of ideology, value judgements, and political interest.
5. Social choices are rarely guided by the most rational or carefully reasoned objectives. Instead, ideas that are politically expedient, serve vested interests, or enjoy support from public opinion, the media, or economic elites tend to dominate. As such, objectives are often shaped by the logic of power rather than by objective evaluation.
6. Historically, social development has been shaped less by comprehensive top-down design than by evolutionary processes. Institutions and practices have changed gradually through adaptation, learning, and the transmission of tradition—that is, through many small,⁹ reversible adjustments that can be corrected in light of experience. Modern attempts at central planning are a relatively recent innovation, dating back to the Enlightenment, and often clash with this evolutionary logic.

Radical Progress as Ideology

In the previous sections, progress was treated as a philosophical concept, and a distinction was drawn between moderate and radical forms. In a philosophical sense, we can speak of progress only as long as the idea remains open to criticism and correction—something that typically characterizes moderate understandings of progress. Progress becomes an ideology when a particular interpretation claims a monopoly on what counts as ‘true’ progress and reacts with hostility to any criticism.

Radical progress as an ideology first emerged during the French Revolution. In the National Convention (1792–1795), the radical Jacobins (Montagnards) sat on the left, while the more moderate Girondins moved to the right. Thus, in its original political meaning, the left wing represented radical progress, while the right wing represented moderate progress.

In the name of equality, the left demanded the abolition of monarchy and the radical restructuring of property relations, while the right supported more moderate reforms, respecting private property, the market economy, and the principles of the Enlightenment—such as equality before the law, separation of powers, and freedom of speech and religion.

This revolutionary zeal re-emerges with Marx and Engels, who, also positioned on the left, viewed the class struggle as the engine of historical progress and proclaimed the ultimate goal to be a classless society. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century progressivism thus focused on achieving radical material equality. This dogmatic belief system justified the use of violence—both in seizing power and in radically transforming society.

At the heart of the communist project was the abolition of private property and the market economy. Dismantling these structures required the total concentration of power and the use of force. The result was catastrophic: communist regimes were responsible for the death of at least 100 million people. State-owned, centrally planned economies produced bloated bureaucracies and a kind of enforced equality in poverty. Radical egalitarianism undermined meritocracy, destroyed incentives, and led to long-term societal stagnation. Meanwhile, members of the communist elite enjoyed privileges and access to resources far beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. As Orwell famously put it, ‘All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others’.

The Elimination of Moderate Conservatives

As noted earlier, there are two currents on the progressive side: moderate and radical progressivism. For the sake of symmetry, we may also distinguish two forms of conservatism, which we can formally call ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ conservatism, although the meaning of these labels is less straightforward. Radical conservatism denotes a rigid attachment to the status quo—which is usually called traditionalism or hard conservatism. Moderate conservatism, by contrast, expresses a more flexible attachment to the existing order: it remains loyal to established frameworks but is open to change within them. In practice, there is often little substantive difference between the moderate conservative and moderate progressive positions, just as there is no clear divide between right-wing and left-wing reformers. In this context, we are therefore dealing with three distinct camps: hard conservatism (traditionalism), moderate conservatism (reformers), and radical progressivism.

Statesmen such as Adenauer, Kohl, and Thatcher can be seen as representatives of this conservative reformist tradition. They implemented substantial reforms—such as tax restructuring and market deregulation—that meaningfully altered the status quo. These leaders showed in practice what moderate conservatism means: not traditionalist adherence to the status quo, but reform within the existing institutional framework. In the Hungarian context, Széchenyi’s reformism exemplifies moderate conservatism, in contrast to both Kossuth’s radicalism and the traditional conservatism of the pro-Habsburg camp.

As the political and media landscape becomes increasingly polarized between hard conservatism and radical progressivism, intermediate positions become ever harder to sustain. Moderate conservatives appear too progressive for traditionalists and too conservative for radicals; they are distrusted from both sides and gradually lose political and cultural space. In this polarized environment, political incentives and public attention increasingly gravitate toward the two poles, while moderate conservatism survives only as a shrinking, embattled middle ground.

Radical progressivism reinforces this tendency at the level of language. It reserves the label ‘progressive’ for itself and describes its opponents simply as ‘conservative’, leaving no conceptual space for moderate conservatism as a legitimate alternative. In this way, it posits a false choice: either one supports radical change, or one defends traditionalism. This rhetorical strategy excludes moderate advocates of progress. If radical progressivism succeeds in reducing political choice to a simple opposition between ‘progress’ and ‘stagnation’, ‘change’ and ‘permanence’, then, given the spirit of our age, it has in effect already won the ideological battle. Historical examples illustrate this logic clearly.

The Jacobins identified the right with the supporters of the ancien régime and thus tried to exclude the possibility of moderate progress from political discourse. The ideological success of communism likewise owed much to its appropriation of the language of progress and to its branding of more moderate currents within the workers’ movement—such as social democracy or smallholder parties—as traitors and ‘class enemies’.

For this reason, the remainder of this paper will follow the prevailing terminology, using ‘progressivism’ to refer to radical progressivism and ‘conservatism’ to include all other non-radical positions: hard and moderate conservatism as well as moderate progressivism.

New Progressivism

The contemporary ‘new progressivism’—often associated with Woke politics, gender ideology, political correctness, and political globalism—has emerged as a dominant current in the early twenty-first century. Like earlier progressive movements such as Jacobinism and Marxism, it is driven by ambitious ideological goals, presents itself as standing on the right side of history, and portrays its opponents as being on the wrong side. Its aim is not merely to correct specific injustices but to reshape society as a whole and secure cultural hegemony.

At the same time, new progressivism differs from earlier forms of progressivism in both focus and methods. Whereas nineteenth- and twentieth-century movements centred on economic issues—the condition of workers, capitalism, and private property—today’s radical progressivism concentrates on identity: sex and gender, family and childbearing, immigration, and the nation. And while some traditional left-wing groups still rely on street violence, the dominant contemporary strategy seeks social transformation through legal and bureaucratic means. This is often described as ‘juristocracy’: norms are first codified at the international or European level and then imposed on nation states through binding legal obligations. In this way, progressive elites can bypass the popular will and reshape society without broad democratic consent.

Sex and Gender

Conservatives often approach the question of sex and gender from a religious or biologically grounded perspective. From a biological standpoint, human reproduction presupposes two sexes: male and female. Intersex variations and other atypical conditions are usually regarded as exceptional biological deviations, some of which are associated with reduced fertility. From this viewpoint, dismantling heteronormativity is seen as undermining reproductive stability itself.

Progressives, by contrast, reject heteronormativity and interpret ‘sex and gender’ as a spectrum shaped by social and cultural forces. For them, identity is not determined by biological sex but by individual self-expression and autonomy. Sex and gender are understood as fluid and multifaceted, allowing for a multiplicity of identities beyond the male–female binary. In this framework, the emphasis shifts from reproductive roles to the affirmation of personal identity and self-realization.¹⁰

Marriage and Childbearing

A similar divide appears in attitudes toward marriage and childbearing. Conservatives tend to view this institution primarily through the lens of reproduction and social cohesion. The traditional or natural family is seen as the cornerstone of demographic stability and long-term social cohesion, and thus as an institution to be preserved.¹¹ Progressives, by contrast, emphasize the diversity of family forms, including same-sex marriage and adoption, viewing them as expressions of personal freedom and equality.¹²

The decline of the traditional family model in developed countries has had the unintended consequence of contributing to falling birth rates. In OECD countries, the fertility rate currently stands at about 1.5 children per woman—meaning that within a single generation, roughly 30 per cent fewer children are born than would be needed to maintain the population. From a conservative perspective, this anti-natalist trend constitutes one of the most serious threats to the survival and long-term viability of developed countries. The ‘demographic winter’—marked by low fertility, population ageing, and population decline—cannot ultimately be reconciled with their continued development.¹³

Mass Immigration

The conservative approach seeks to regulate immigration through strict border controls, efforts to curb illegal migration, and restrictions based on economic and cultural considerations.¹⁴ Progressives, conversely, tend to frame immigration as a human right and argue that it should, in principle, face only minimal restrictions. They see immigration as a valuable social and economic resource,¹⁵ and believe that, with appropriate integration policies, peaceful coexistence among culturally diverse communities is achievable—a view famously captured by Angela Merkel’s phrase ‘Wir schaffen das’.

From a strictly demographic perspective, in ageing, low-fertility societies, population decline can be averted only by immigration on a mass, population-replacing scale. Conservatives warn, however, that such large inflows carry grave risks: population replacement, civilizational submission, or even civil war. Historical analogies include the more recent case of Kosovo, where sustained Albanian immigration led to demographic dominance and political separation from Serbia.

Nation

Conservatives or patriots understand the nation as a political and cultural community that provides the framework for a familiar, ‘at-home’ way of life: shared language, customs, solidarity, and collective defence.¹⁶ Progressives, by contrast, tend to see the nation as an outdated and exclusionary construct, magnifying its burdens of obligation and cost while downplaying its benefits. For progressive elites, strong nation states are also an obstacle to their project of building a post-national, federal, or even world-state order that would be easier to govern from above. Accordingly, in other debates as well, they tend to adopt positions that weaken the demographic and cultural foundations of the national community.

These tensions around national identity and sovereignty are no longer confined to the realm of ideas but increasingly manifest themselves in legal and bureaucratic struggles. Progressive forces in power are increasingly relying on bureaucratic instruments to restrict freedom of expression and suppress the popular will, as US Vice President JD Vance has warned. In France, Marine Le Pen has been barred from standing in the next election by a court ruling. In Germany, the domestic intelligence service has classified the AfD as an extremist organization, a step that could justify its exclusion from public life. Hungary, which insists on maintaining strict border controls and a regulated migration policy, has been ordered by the Court of Justice of the European Union to pay a daily fine of €1 million. After nationalist Călin Georgescu unexpectedly won the first round of the 2024 presidential election, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the vote on dubious legal grounds. This move overruled the democratic will of the electorate and is a textbook example of how juristocracy can be abused.

Once in power, new progressivism is sooner or later driven to coercion in order to impose progressive identities that lack genuine majority support. Such efforts risk triggering a chain reaction of social upheaval and political instability, further accelerating a civilizational decline already set in motion by progressive value choices—low fertility, population ageing, and mass immigration. As with its twentieth-century predecessors, the trajectory points toward new authoritarian regimes marked by ideological rigidity, a narrowing of political discourse, and growing intolerance of dissent. Yet history is not predetermined: where radical progressivism fails to achieve lasting hegemony or is checked by countervailing institutions, such outcomes can still be avoided.

Competing Visions of World Order

Beyond domestic politics, the same ideological divide also shapes debates over European integration and the future of the international order. Western progressives tend to envision a post-national, quasi-federal Europe with porous borders and strong supranational institutions—a step toward a world-state-like model. Conservatives, by contrast, defend the ‘Europe of nations’ and, more generally, a system of cooperation among sovereign states.

This fault line between progressives and patriots is also visible in their attitudes toward the Russia–Ukraine War. Progressive actors generally regard the clear defeat of Russia and the comprehensive restructuring of the European and global security order under Western leadership as the primary objective. Conservatives, by contrast, attach greater importance to the rapid restoration of peace and to a negotiated settlement that re-establishes a stable balance of power among the great powers. These positions reflect two competing visions of world order. Progressive thought is closer to the idealist school of international relations: it seeks to reshape the entire system according to utopian normative principles, ultimately aiming at a world-state-like order led by a progressive elite. Conservative thought is closer to the realist tradition, which focuses on interests, power balances, and the prevention of major wars.

In this situation, two basic scenarios emerge. The progressive script interprets the current conflicts—the war between Russia and Ukraine and the growing confrontation between the West and the BRICS countries—as a struggle between what it calls ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’, and views the goal as a ‘progressive peace’ (pax progressiva). In practice, however, ‘democracy’ in this narrative often means the dominance of progressive values and elites rather than the straightforward expression of the voters’ will, while ‘autocracy’ frequently serves as a label for societies that do not conform to the progressive or juristocratic model. Moreover, the very idea of classic ‘democracy’ is difficult to apply in a meaningful way beyond the level of nation states—for example, to the European Union or to a hypothetical world state. Within this progressive framework, war between the forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ appears almost inevitable and must continue until ‘democracy’ has achieved complete victory over ‘autocracy’. Just as earlier forms of progressivism—such as communism—imagined a final great war between the ‘good’ system and the ‘evil’ one, new progressivism tends to read the world through a similar lens. Moreover, progressive actors can invoke war to justify the suppression of conservative forces, thereby consolidating their dominance not only in the international sphere but also in domestic politics.

The conservative reading, by contrast, accepts that different interpretations, interests, and centres of power will continue to exist. In foreign policy, patriotism therefore aligns with political realism and is content with a stable balance among states. In domestic politics, conservative thought seeks to preserve the core liberal-democratic achievements of the twentieth century—above all, freedom of speech and popular sovereignty, where political power reflects the will of the majority. This stands in sharp contrast to a progressive juristocracy, in which key decisions are increasingly shaped by progressive courts and bureaucratic institutions rather than by the voters themselves.

Conclusion

The main findings of this study can be summarized in the following theses:

1. The essence of progress lies in the lasting improvement of the social condition, which is a morally right and desirable objective. A common misconception, however, is that progress is inevitable—and that any change is therefore regarded as progress. In other words, social change is treated as automatically good.
2. Change is a central element of progress; therefore, radicalism expresses the nature of progress more clearly than moderation. For this reason, radical progressive movements tend to be more successful in ideological struggles than either moderate reformers or traditionalist currents. Paradoxically, the very traits that help radical progressivism win these battles—above all its refusal to compromise—are also the ones that make it so destructive once it gains power.
3. Centrally planned, large-scale social engineering tends, for a multitude of reasons, to cause more harm than good. Society is too complex to be redesigned reliably from the centre. Major reforms always produce unintended side effects, and political decisions are often driven more by interests and emotions than by careful reasoning.
4. A fundamental distinction exists between old (Jacobinism, Marxism) and new forms of radical progressivism (Woke ideology, gender studies, political globalism). The primary aim of old progressivism was the establishment of economic equality through violent or revolutionary means. In contrast, the new radicalism seeks to transform traditional identities (nation, family, sexuality) and to promote their reinterpretation through left-liberal values. This is pursued primarily through a combination of communication strategies, media influence, and legal regulation.
5. Just as old radicalism led to social instability, decline, and severe crises, new radicalism poses similar threats. In light of this, the only reasonable course is moderate (conservative) progress: gradual reform that seeks improvement while preserving society’s proven institutional and cultural frameworks and taking account of social complexity and local knowledge. Traditionalism—the uncritical preservation of the status quo—is no real alternative either.

NOTES

1 Douglas Harper, ‘Progress’, Online Etymology Dictionary, www.etymonline.com/word/progress, accessed 15 December 2025.

2 Philip Kitcher, ‘The Enlightenment conception of progress is teleological in the sense that it posits a goal or telos…Human reason enables the realization of this goal, which brings about an objective improvement in the human condition.’ In Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Autumn 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/progress.

3 ‘Types and Stages of Social Movements’, in ‘Introduction to Sociology’ (Module 18), Lumen Learning (2021), https://courses.lumenlearning.com/wm-introductiontosociology/chapter/types-and-stages-of-social-movements/.

4 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

5 Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden and Other Poems (Methuen & Co., 1899).

6 Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race (Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003).

7 Cormac Ó Gráda, Black ’47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory (Princeton University Press, 1999).

8 Ronald Wright, A Short History of Progress (House of Anansi Press, 2024).

9 Fridrick A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (University of Chicago Press, 1988). 10 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, 1990.)

11 David Popenoe, ‘American Family Decline, 1960–1990: A Review and Appraisal’, Journal of Marriage and Family, 55/3 (1993), 527–542.

12 Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: How Love Conquered Marriage (Penguin Books, 2005.)

13 János I. Tóth, ‘Demographic Winter and Modernization’, Hungarian Conservative (3 January 2022).

14 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (Simon & Schuster, 2004.)

15 Robert D. Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 30/2 (2007), 137–174.

16 Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity.

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