Hungarian Conservative

While 13 per cent of Hungarians would vote for Magyar’s party in the EP elections, which represents a significant shift in just a few weeks, the new party has failed to attract uncertain or inactive voters, nor has it gained significant support from Fidesz voters; its voters come largely from supporters of left-wing parties, causing losses for each of them.

A brief review of the European policy of the Hungarian Government and of that of the domestic opposition.

The governing Fidesz-KDNP party coalition in Hungary has maintained their support, while fewer would vote for the parties of the left-wing alliance than did in 2022, as revealed by a joint political year-opening roundtable discussion organized by five polling institutes on Thursday, 11 January in Budapest.

While political festivals are not unique per se, there is something unique about how the Hungarian right organizes its gatherings. Their continuing success is not due to populist chauvinism, or to making them mere echo chambers. In fact, plenty of world views, including opposition voices highly critical of the Orbán administration, clashed on stage in front of captivated audiences many times this summer.

Gáll-Pelcz, a 61-year-old engineer and economist, former EP Vice-President, a mother of three, has proved that she is both a competent leader and also highly qualified for a seat on the European Court of Auditors. She was certified as an international tax expert in 2004. Her qualifications, including being a chartered tax expert, clearly made her a suitable candidate for a role that is mostly related to EU taxation and auditing.

There are two models of opposition—one that is based on cooperation and one that is based on absolute rejection. While democracies are characterised by cooperation between the ruling and opposition parties, out-of-power parties in Hungary are unwilling to cooperate with the ruling coalition, which results in their ineffectiveness.

It remains to be seen, however, if this desperate craving for attention, and the aggressive and violent actions that some of the opposition forces engage in are appealing to the Hungarian electorate. It is more likely that meaningful, constructive actions, and a comprehensive and relevant political agenda would benefit these opposition parties more than any of the stunts they have been recently engaging in.

Not only has the left-wing camp become more fragmented due to Péter Márki-Zay’s movement becoming an independent party, and the former leader of Jobbik founding a new movement, but it has also shrunk in terms of popular support.

Both Nézőpont Intézet, typically associated with the governing party, and Medián, generally viewed as closer to the opposition, put Fidesz ahead of the strongest opposition party, the Democratic Coalition (DK), by over 35 percentage points.

As customary, this year, too, all major party leaders in Hungary delivered remarks. The messages of the various politicians on the lessons for today of Hungary’s revolutionary and heroic past could not have been more diverse.

The offshore scandal in which Judit Rácz Földi of DK has been implicated serves as an excellent opportunity for Momentum to take on DK in the struggle for dominance on the left.

Many politicians from smaller and less successful opposition parties have transferred to DK since the last election in April 2022. The reshuffling of old faces, however, is unlikely to bring more electoral support for DK.

There is evidence that the news website Nyugati Fény (which, ironically, translates as ‘Western Light’) is being funded by a foreign left-wing entity.