This article was originally published in Vol. 6 No. 1 of our print edition.

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A Challenge for Christian Integralists

The West is witnessing a radicalization of political positions and entering an attendant state of social chaos and confusion. Issues such as immigration, gender ideology, radical environmentalism, national economic autonomy, and globalist governance have created deep polarization, making any form of agreement seem impossible. At the root of this turmoil lies a broader civilizational crisis, and in such a context, dialogue itself becomes impossible, as opposing perspectives are not merely different but fundamentally irreconcilable because they stand at civilizational antipodes.

We live in an era commonly referred to as ‘postmodern’ or ‘post-liberal’, and rather than engaging in a lengthy analysis of these terms and their etymological ambiguities, it is more practical to define this era through a simple analogy: a fruit. Like a fruit, this era has both a ‘peel’ and a ‘pulp’. The ‘peel’ consists of two primary elements: a market-based economy—capitalism—and democratic political institutions, both of which are imbricated in liberal political theory. The ‘pulp’, on the other hand, extends beyond liberalism. Since the May 1968 protests, Western philosophy and culture have been transformed by deconstructionism—a philosophical perspective that is also known as post-structuralism or, more broadly and mistakenly, postmodernism. Using liberal individualism, which dominates the system’s ‘peel’ as its raw material, the deconstructionist ‘pulp’ drives individuals toward the pursuit of absolute emancipation from both reality and nature, and this philosophical and cultural dynamic, which has profound economic and political ramifications, is the primary catalyst for contemporary ‘culture wars’ in the West. In essence, the current culture wars are a struggle between those who seek to ‘advance’ toward an anarchic and apocalyptic deconstructed civilization¹ and those who strive to preserve an order built upon the foundational pillars of Western civilization.

Within the latter group, we find the illiberals, who lack a singular, well-defined doctrine, and this absence of a cohesive framework stems from several factors: a perpetual defensive stance against the rapid advance of progressivism, an ingrained anti-intellectualism, and the challenge of formulating a unified political theory while preserving the distinct identities of diverse cultures. As a result, illiberals find themselves entrenched in a survival-oriented, reactionary sovereigntism, and as a result, they have yet to articulate a coherent historical project² beyond mere resistance.

This article explores a theoretical approach to Christian integralism, a position aligned with the illiberal pole due to its unapologetic advocacy for governance according to natural law principles, seeking to wield political power in service of the common good. As such, in this framework, elements that liberalism regards as the ultimate goals of social organization—such as free-market economics and democracy—are seen by Christian integralists merely as conditioned instruments serving a higher purpose: the fulfilment of human potential in accordance with the common good. An implicit thesis of this essay, therefore, is that an illiberal right with a Christian integralist orientation must take the strategic initiative in sustaining a transcendent political project—one that surpasses the limitations of mere illiberalism and extends beyond the reach of both fusionism and libertarianism.

Natural law political philosophy connects with a Christian integralist praxis through a theoretical framework: political realism. However, this political realism is also shared by other conservative positions. Thus, one of the necessary theoretical challenges for Christian integralism is to precisely define the characteristics of its understanding of political realism and to determine its concrete applications in the contemporary political landscape.

‘An illiberal right with a Christian integralist orientation must take the strategic initiative in sustaining a transcendent political project’

To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of realism: secular realism (usually associated with politics) and metaphysical realism (usually associated with philosophy and law). While the former has maintained intellectual hegemony within conservative thought for the past 500 years, the latter has largely remained confined to the annals of history, and though it has been revisited primarily by jurists defending natural law within legal scholarship, its categories have not yet been systematically updated or coherently integrated into disciplines such as political science, political economy, international relations, or geopolitics. The main thesis of this essay, then, is that Christian political integralism must work to bridge the divide between metaphysical realism and secular realism, overcoming the shortcomings and limitations of the latter through the lens of the former’s tradition and approach.

To analyse both forms of realism, I will employ a conceptual framework of my own design for the study of philosophical and political theories, which I term SIN (speculation, intellection, and normative decantation). This framework consists of three key dimensions: (1) the ontological-epistemological speculation that gives rise to a particular political theory; (2) the process of intellection, or intellectual apprehension, through which reality is known and understood; and (3) the normative decantation by which policies and strategies are prescribed in pursuit of a historical project.

In the study of political theory, ontological-epistemological speculation constitutes the initial phase of critical reflection on the foundations of being and knowledge within the political realm. Ontologically, it examines the nature and existence of political entities such as the state, power, and society. Epistemologically, it questions how we come to know and understand these entities. This phase is speculative in the sense that it is not necessarily grounded in empirical data but rather in the formulation of philosophical and conceptual hypotheses that lay the groundwork for subsequent analysis.

Intellection refers to the process of deep and systematic comprehension of political concepts, phenomena, or problems, building upon the foundations established in ontological or epistemological speculation. This is the stage in which the theorist intellectually processes ideas and categories, integrating philosophical reflection with empirical analysis, existing theoretical frameworks, or concrete case studies. The goal is to move beyond initial speculation and construct a more structured and coherent understanding, identifying relationships between key concepts—for example, the interplay between liberty and authority or between justice and power. Intellection thus entails an exercise in abstraction and synthesis, allowing the theorist to develop a clearer vision of the political issue at hand.

Normative decantation represents the final phase of this process, wherein the ontological and epistemological reflections, alongside the structured comprehension achieved through intellection, are translated into normative judgments or ethical prescriptions regarding how political reality ought to be. At this stage, the theorist does not merely describe or analyse the political realm, but also evaluates and proposes principles, values, or rules that should guide political action, arriving at practical or ethical conclusions that can inform decision-making or critique opposing political conceptions. Through an SIN analysis of both metaphysical realism in its moderate form and secular realism,³ we will identify their defining characteristics and fundamental differences.

Metaphysical Realism in Its Moderate Form: Aristotelian-Thomism

Metaphysical realism is a philosophical framework and, in its moderate form, is also known as Scholasticism, Aristotelian Thomism, or simply Thomism, given that Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are its principal exponents.⁴

1.A. Ontological Speculation

Scholastic metaphysical realism asserts that reality exists independently of human perception and that ‘forms’ or ‘essences’ are intrinsic to objects and beings. In political terms, this implies that political entities—such as the state, community, or law—possess an objective nature and are not merely subjective or arbitrary constructions. Moreover, an objective common good exists, derived from human nature and the teleology (finality) of human beings as rational and social creatures. Politics, as a human activity, must therefore align itself with this nature and finality, fostering human flourishing (eudaimonia / beatitudo) and the common good.

1.B. Epistemological Speculation

Aristotelian Thomism posits that knowledge is acquired through the complementary use of reason and empirical observation, while also being informed by metaphysical and theological principles. In political thought, natural laws (including moral law) can be discerned through reason, which enables us to recognize the inherent order of the world. Additionally, divine revelation supplements reason, particularly in ethical and normative matters. Thus, political knowledge is not purely empirical but is grounded in universal principles derived from human nature and the cosmic order.

2. Key Categories of Intellection

I. Human Nature: according to Aristotle and Aquinas, the human being is a political—and social—animal (ζῷον πολιτικόν), whose ultimate purpose is to achieve happiness through virtue while living in a community. Politics, therefore, must be structured to facilitate this end.

II. The Common Good: politics should not serve individual interests but rather the good of the entire community, which is superior to private interests. This common good is more than the mere sum of individual goods and is defined by natural law, which represents the participation of human reason in the eternal law.

III. Law and Justice: human laws must be derived from natural law. A law that contradicts natural law is inherently unjust and therefore lacks legitimacy. Resistance, disobedience, and rebellion against unjust laws and rulers are justified.

IV. Authority and Government: political authority is legitimate only insofar as it serves the common good and respects natural law. Aristotle and Aquinas argue that any form of government—whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy—can be justified, provided it promotes virtue and the common good within its particular socio-political context.

V. Justice: Society presupposes ontological equality among rational beings, yet recognizes natural differences in hierarchies, functions, merits, and responsibilities. Justice consists of giving each their due, harmonizing rights and duties under natural law so that laws and institutions ensure proportional contribution to, and benefit from, the common good according to each member’s role and dignity.

VI. Totality and subsidiarity: Society is an organic whole of hierarchically ordered parts, each with intrinsic value and proper ends. Totality holds that parts exist for the whole, while the whole flourishes through its parts, making the common good and personal good interdependent. Subsidiarity holds that higher levels of society, such as the state itself, should not absorb or usurp the proper functions of lower levels, but rather assist them when necessary to achieve their own ends, thereby preserving both the autonomy of the parts and the integrity of the whole.

3. Normative Decantation

Given that Aristotelian Thomism asserts the existence of an objective common good, politics cannot be neutral regarding values. Instead, it must actively promote human flourishing. This translates into the following principles:

I. Political institutions must actively promote virtue and the common good. This could manifest in public policies that encourage ethical education or foster civic engagement in political deliberation.

II. Laws must be subordinate to natural law. For instance, legislation that permits unjust exploitation of workers, promotes so-called ‘freedoms’ that lead to human degradation, or causes severe environmental harm could be deemed illegitimate.

III. Political leaders must be virtuous and guided by reason and natural law, rather than personal ambition or demagogic interests.

IV. While Aristotelian Thomism emphasizes the existence of an objective common good, it also acknowledges the particularity of historical and social contexts. Aquinas, for example, concedes that human laws should adapt to specific circumstances, provided they do not contradict natural law.

Secular Political Realism or State-Centric Realism

Secular political realism, also understood as state-centric realism, is a theoretical framework that derives from the division made by humanism and rationalism between politics and Christian morality, being itself a reaction to the political application of metaphysical realism. This current was developed throughout the historical process of modernity (from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries) by authors such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin, Karl von Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt, and Hans Morgenthau.⁵

‘It is imperative to move beyond the intellectual ivory tower’

1.A. Ontological Speculation

State-centric political realism is based on a vision of politics as a domain dominated by power and the inherent conflict of human relationships. The state is the fundamental unit of politics, the source of authority, and the guarantor of order. For thinkers like Bodin and Hobbes, the state is a necessary construct to contain the chaos of the human condition. Furthermore, politics is not based on ethical or normative ideals but rather on the struggle for power and survival. In this view, human nature is conflictual, and in the international context, states act out of self-interest and the pursuit of power. Consequently, politics—especially in relations between states (as Morgenthau argues)—is characterized by competition and the ever-present possibility of war. Schmitt, for his part, defines the ‘political’ as the ability to distinguish between friends and enemies.

1.B. Epistemological Speculation

Knowledge in political realism is based on the empirical observation of history and human behaviour rather than on ideal or normative speculations. Machiavelli and Morgenthau, for example, emphasize the study of history to understand the dynamics of power, as they believe politics is best comprehended by analysing how leaders and states have acted in the past.

Hobbes and Bodin, on the other hand, use a logical approach to justify the necessity of the state, as when they posit the social contract as a rational solution to the state of nature. Ultimately, political knowledge does not seek universal truths but rather effective strategies for maintaining power and stability, as what matters is what works, not what ‘should work’.

2. Key Categories of Intellection

I. Power: it is both the means and the end of politics, encompassing not only military and economic strength but also the strategic ability to influence, coerce, or persuade others in the pursuit of national interests. Power is not inherently moral or immoral; it is a fact of human and interstate relations arising from the perpetual struggle for security and dominance.

II. Sovereignty: the absolute and indivisible power of the state. It is the foundation of political authority and the capacity to make decisions without external restrictions.

III. Reason of State and State of Exception: the state exists to prevent the chaos inherent in the state of nature, making the preservation of order and security its supreme end. To fulfill this purpose, the sovereign is entrusted with absolute authority, justified by the principle of reason of state, which legitimizes all necessary actions for the survival of the polity, even when they transgress ordinary moral or legal norms. In times of crisis, this authority is expressed through the sovereign decision, which is the power to invoke the state of exception and temporarily suspend the legal order if the preservation of the common order demands it.

IV. National Interest and Balance of Power: in the international arena, states act according to their national interest, defined in terms of power. International politics is an anarchic game of power equilibrium rather than idealistic cooperation.

V. Friend–Enemy Distinction: this criterion underlies all political action, as the unity and identity of a community are affirmed through the recognition of what threatens its existence.

VI. War: this is not a suspension of political order, merely an expression of it, as war is an outcome of enmity and competition among sovereign powers in an anarchic world. In this regard, war is neither an aberration nor a failure of morality but a natural instrument of political action.

3. Normative Decantation

Political realism challenges the idea of politics based on universal moral principles, arguing that political ethics are contextual and subordinate to the survival of the state. From this, the following guidelines emerge:

I. Policies must prioritize the stability and survival of the state, which may justify measures such as invoking the state of exception and suspending rights in times of deep crisis, existential conflicts, or national emergencies.

II. Rulers must act according to effectiveness rather than moral ideals. A consequence of this principle is that internal stability should take precedence over international public opinion.

III. The state must guarantee the security of its citizens at all costs, even if this means the ruler’s power becomes authoritarian.

IV. Foreign policy should seek to maintain a balance of power at the international level, avoiding both the hegemony of a single state and the idealism of global cooperation, which often contradicts national interests.

The Shortcomings of Secular Realism from the Perspective of Moderate Metaphysical Realism

First, we must recognize that we are comparing two intellectual traditions with different worldviews. Metaphysical realism operates within a philosophical framework, engaging with fundamental questions about the nature of existence itself. Secular realism, by contrast, bypasses these metaphysical inquiries and focuses on the practice of governance, and as a theoretical framework, it remains open to influence from various philosophical traditions. For example, humanism shaped the realism of Machiavelli and Bodin, rationalism influenced Hobbes’s positions, idealism inspired Clausewitz, voluntarism and phenomenology left their mark on Schmitt’s thought, and pragmatism informed Morgenthau’s work. This raises a question: how can moderate metaphysical realism engage with the categories developed by secular realism?

What these traditions share is both fundamental and highly relevant: namely, the premise that an objective reality exists beyond individual subjectivities. While this assertion may seem basic, it is in fact a profound and radical statement—and one that directly challenges the prevailing postmodern view in contemporary Western culture, which casts doubt on the very possibility of truth. The idea of truth as a basis for understanding reality serves as a crucial foundation for building a common framework. However, despite its significance, this principle alone is insufficient unless it is carefully and systematically applied to concrete aspects of analysis. In this sense, the first and most radical difference between these two forms of realism lies in their understanding of truth. By engaging with the question of existence, moderate metaphysical realism grounds its ontological assumptions in theological transcendence, viewing it as the foundation of a cosmic order from which certain laws emerge to explain material reality. Secular realism, by contrast, omits this foundational inquiry and adopts instead an immanent and ultimately incomplete view of reality—one that fosters a pessimistic understanding of human nature and governance in which power becomes the central concern. By neglecting the cosmological dimension, secular realism falls into the same trap as classical liberalism: the absence of metaphysical foundations is never truly an absence but rather an empty space that is inevitably filled by alternative cosmologies. In this case, it is mechanistic and emanationist frameworks—usually propagated by communist theory—that take hold. This insight sheds light on why the post-Cold War fusionist neoconservative doctrine proved inadequate in preventing the ongoing civilizational decline.

The divergence between these two realist traditions profoundly shapes their understanding of both the human being and the state—core categories upon which any political theory must be built. In moderate metaphysical realism, while the fallen nature of humanity is acknowledged as a theological reality, the possibility of achieving beatitudo (ultimate happiness or fulfilment) remains intact. The state, in this view, serves as a means through which a natural society aids individuals in pursuing this higher goal.

Secular realism, on the other hand, envisions human beings as existing within a chaotic, principle-less (an-arkhé) reality, where the struggle for power defines all interactions. Here, ruling the state is both the means and the ultimate end, as it both embodies and enforces power. A radical offshoot of this chaotic vision is anarchism, which operates on the same premise: the absence of a transcendent order. In this framework, the state arises ‘artificially’ to impose order, and from this artificiality stems the belief that it is an instrument of oppression—the infamous Leviathan. Consequently, anarchism positions itself as an ‘anti-Leviathan’, seeking to embrace chaos as a new and supposedly superior order. In this regard, secular realism ultimately undermines itself, as its failure to properly address the question of moral good leaves the door open for those who would destroy it.

It is important to emphasize that moderate metaphysical realism, drawing from Aristotle’s concept of the Golden Mean and Christianity’s recognition of both the material and immaterial realms, seeks to establish equilibrium across various dimensions, most notably between moral ideals and empirical practice. Secular realism, by contrast, rejects all universal ideals and focuses solely on pragmatic action, thereby disrupting this balance. This distinction becomes particularly evident in the political thought of Aquinas. While his inquiries begin at the highest level of abstraction, addressing eternal law, he ultimately arrives at highly practical considerations of political realism. He acknowledges the importance of particular needs and the contextual application of principles by different peoples and nations—an insight that even secular realists would concede. This demonstrates that complementarities within political realism as a whole are not only possible but necessary.

A similar contrast can be observed in the epistemological foundations of both traditions. While secular realism incorporates both rationalist and empiricist approaches, it lacks a unified epistemological framework. Moderate metaphysical realism, on the other hand, coherently integrates a priori reasoning with empirical investigation, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of real-world conditions in which natural law can be effectively applied. As a result, the vast difference between the normative stances of these two forms of realism stems directly from their divergent speculative foundations.

In order to arrive at a fruitful conclusion, I will briefly examine how reflecting on specific categories of intellection can yield valuable insights for future theoretical investigations, which requires subordinating the categories articulated by secular realism to those advanced by moderate metaphysical realism. In this light, four key considerations emerge: (1) all political categories should be oriented toward enabling human nature to fulfil its natural ends; (2) they must be ordered under the aegis of a superior, objective common good; (3) their justice is contingent upon their conformity with natural law; and (4) the political authority tasked with enacting these categories must derive its legitimacy from adherence to natural law.

With this established framework, all such categories are reconceptualized as means to a teleological end, rather than ends in themselves, as secular realists have often posited. This perspective will guide the subsequent development of our analysis on them:

1. Power: construing power as a means rather than an end in itself offers a framework for purging politics of corruption—or at least for rendering corrupt practices more discernible, as corruption should be understood as the distortion arising from the confusion of means and ends. The legitimacy of power hinges on its subordination to the common good and natural law. Though this principle may appear rudimentary or aligned with ‘common sense’, its implementation, as is widely acknowledged, proves far more challenging than its articulation.

2. Sovereignty and National Interests: the proposition that sovereignty may be deemed illegitimate when it contravenes the common good and natural law is a delicate matter, as it directly challenges the tenets of illiberal sovereigntism. This tension finds historical resonance in the theories of Francisco de Vitoria, which posit that Christian nations might legitimately intervene in states where egregious violations of natural law have occurred—a position often critiqued as pre-liberal or pre-Kantian.⁶ However, intervening nations or supranational entities must themselves be scrutinized for their adherence to the common good. Consequently, interventions justified by postmodern liberal values, as upheld by certain supranational bodies, may be considered prima facie illegitimate, given that their prevailing principles usually fail to align with an objective common good and do not outweigh the injustices they purport to address.

3. Reason of State and the State of Exception: in Schmitt’s framework, emergencies return power to whoever can wield it, unbound by moral or idealistic constraints, thereby revealing the essence of true sovereignty. This premise, steeped in philosophical voluntarism, stands in stark opposition to natural law philosophy, which maintains that the common good remains objective regardless of circumstances. Natural law demands that rulers adapt their principles to specific contexts, a view rooted in the Aristotelian rule of law. The resulting contention between Schmitt’s decisionism and this classical perspective constitutes a pivotal debate for the future of political realism.

4. The Friend–Enemy Distinction: Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy offers a valuable lens and crucial feature for safeguarding the common good and natural law, including the recognition of ‘internal enemies’. However, Schmitt’s limited exploration of the ‘friendship’ component presents an opportunity for enrichment through the Aristotelian theory of friendship,⁷ which could provide a more balanced conceptualization of this dynamic.

5. International Balance of Power: re-examining geopolitics and international relations through the prism of natural law represents an ambitious yet worthwhile endeavour. Assessing how a nation navigates a given framework of international hegemony requires a rigorously realistic analysis, and it is insufficient to merely assert that an international order should uphold a planetary common good—a notion that risks becoming utopian and detached from human reality. Rather, a nation governed by the principles of natural law must adopt a coherent stance in the global arena, prioritizing the welfare of its citizens, for whom its authorities bear responsibility. Furthermore, the traditional concept of Ius Gentium, grounded in natural law, merits renewed scrutiny as a potential foundation for articulating a geopolitical posture consistent with moderate metaphysical realism.⁸

6. Just Rebellion and Civil Disobedience: Aquinas’s principle of just rebellion presents a direct challenge to the Hobbesian concept of the state, as it asserts that the people—by virtue of human nature itself—can rightfully declare a ruler or regime illegitimate, rejecting their authority to the extent that insurrection becomes a valid means of ending their rule. However, this line of reasoning is extremely delicate, as it requires careful evaluation of whether the rebellious faction intends to establish a regime aligned with natural law. If not, the rebellion itself becomes unjust. In practice, this issue is deeply controversial, particularly from a liberal perspective. For instance, one could argue that a rebellion driven by communist or ochlocratic principles against an authoritarian regime that is comparatively closer to natural law would be illegitimate. Conversely, an insurrection against a communist government could be entirely justified—even if that government were democratically elected—provided that the rebels aim to establish a new regime more aligned with the common good.

7. National Intelligence: the rational and strategic faculty of the state, which must be conceived not as an instrument of domination or surveillance for its own sake, but as a necessary organ for the discernment of threats to the common good, both internal and external. Within a revised realist framework, intelligence serves prudence: it gathers and interprets information in the service of justice, order, and peace.

8. War: this is neither a moral failure nor an intrinsic necessity of politics, but an exceptional instrument that may, under strict conditions, restore order and justice. Indeed, Clausewitz’s definition of war as ‘the continuation of politics by other means’ emphasizes its instrumental nature. Yet, in the light of the concept of bellum iustum, such instrumentality is never autonomous: war is just only when it is subordinated to right intention, aiming ultimately at the re-establishment of peace in accordance with natural law.

9. Civil War: the most radical negation of the political order. This is not merely a contest for power, but the spiritual and moral collapse of a society. When a civil war breaks out, the primary duty of rulers and citizens alike is to reconstitute the polity’s moral foundations according to natural law. Only a movement genuinely ordered toward restoring justice and legitimate authority can be deemed licit under the Thomistic notion of just rebellion; otherwise, civil conflict becomes a deepening descent into anarchy.

10. Authoritarianism and Tyranny: authoritarianism, though often criticized by liberal theory, can under certain historical and moral conditions serve as a remedial form of government, an exceptional response aimed at restoring order, virtue, and justice when these have been gravely disrupted. Tyranny, by contrast, represents the corruption of authority itself: the use of power as an end in itself, detached from the teleological purpose of promoting the common good.

11. Ochlocracy and Anarchy: both ochlocracy (the rule of the mob) and anarchy (the absence of rule) must be understood as pathological degradations of political order that emerge when authority loses its grounding in the common good and natural law. Ochlocracy arises when the passions of the multitude, rather than reason, govern collective life. Anarchy, on the other hand, signifies the dissolution of the political structure itself. Against both, political realism should assert that legitimate authority, rooted in natural law and oriented toward the common good, is indispensable for the actualization of human flourishing. True liberty, therefore, is not found in chaos, but in obedience to a just and rational order that reflects the ontological and teleological structure of human nature.

Conclusion

In sum, the task of developing a new theoretical framework for political realism through the lens of moderate metaphysical realism remains unfinished. Far from being a purely abstract endeavour, the aim is for this project to have a profound impact on real-world politics. Its theoretical refinement should serve as the foundation for a strong and committed praxis of Christian integralism.

For these efforts to succeed, two essential tasks must be undertaken. First, a genuine willingness for dialogue between traditions is indispensable. Both forms of realism tend to remain intellectually insular, rarely engaging with one another, which results in a lack of meaningful communication. Second, it is imperative to move beyond the intellectual ivory tower, a task crucial not only for fostering discourse between the two realist traditions but also for confronting anti-essentialist political philosophies. While both forms of realism have traditionally regarded liberalism as their primary opponent, they have made little effort to engage critically with deconstructionism and other postmodern frameworks—an essential and unavoidable task for those of us committed to the preservation of Western civilization.

This article is a translation of the original, published in Hungarian: “A metafizikai és politikai realizmus szintézise mint a katolikus integralizmus elengedhetetlen törekvése”. In Ádám Darabos, ed., A kereszt által a fénybe. Keresztény politikai válaszok nyomában (Through the Cross into the Light. In Search of Christian Political Responses) (Axióma Kulturális Alapítvány, 2025), 71–94.

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NOTES

1 This can only be fully understood by pushing deconstructionist thought to its ultimate consequences—a task that reveals its striking resemblance to anarcho-communism in its normative stance. A key example of this connection is found in the rhizomatic concept, introduced in: Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Bloomsbury, 2013). This framework envisions society as a non-hierarchical, decentralized network, akin to a rhizome plant that lacks a central root, rejecting traditional top-down structures (arborescent models) in favour of interconnected, horizontal relations. This vision aligns closely with anarcho-communist ideals, advocating for stateless, egalitarian systems in which power and resources circulate freely without centralized authority. Both frameworks seek to dismantle coercive institutions, emphasizing multiplicity, difference, and collective autonomy as the foundations for a utopian society.

2 I use the concept of the historical project as the materialization of a cosmovision in a determined time and place.

3 There are other expressions of realism that I am leaving outside this analysis, as they do not represent the major approaches in conflict, but I am not claiming that a further exploration of them would not be beneficial. For instance, non-moderate metaphysical realism, represented by thinkers such as Plato and Augustine, is a separate branch within the tradition of metaphysical realism. Moreover, Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism and Jacques Maritain’s Christian Humanism might be identified as modern political realisms nurtured by this non-moderate metaphysical realism.

4 The foundational works of moderate metaphysical realism, particularly in its ethical and political dimensions, include Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, and Politics, and Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica (especially the Treatise on Law), De Regno, and Summa Contra Gentiles.

5 The foundational works of secular political realism include: The Prince by Machiavelli (1532), Leviathan by Hobbes (1651), Six Books of the Republic by Bodin (1576), On War by Clausewitz (1832), Political Theology and The Concept of the Political by Schmitt (1922 and 1932), and Politics Among Nations by Morgenthau (1948). Also, Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War is considered a precursor of this tradition.

6 The foundational work by Vitoria on the topic is De Indis et De Iure Belli Reflectiones (1539).

7 Developed in both Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics.

8 Ius Gentium (law of nations) is a concept extracted from Roman law and later developed in medieval and natural law traditions (e.g. Aquinas and Vitoria). It refers to universal legal principles applicable to all peoples, grounded in reason and natural law, governing relations between individuals and states.

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