In a speech delivered at the World Economic Forum in February, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the EU’s necessity for its ‘independence’ from arguing that the powerful shifts shaking the global order should be treated as a catalyst for good rather than a cataclysm.
She spoke against a backdrop of threats from U.S. President Donald Trump, who suggested either invading or coercing the sale of Greenland—a territory that belongs to Denmark—and imposing tariffs on several European nations that oppose his plans. This marked a significant turning point for a region that has historically favored cautious diplomacy over direct confrontation with the White House.
Although Trump’s threats may have dissipated, the sentiment in Europe regarding the need to reduce dependence on the U.S. for trade, energy, and technology remains strong. Despite Europe’s urgent efforts to bolster its military capabilities and lessen its strategic reliance on the United States, recent studies reveal the extent to which the continent continues to depend on American weaponry, technology, and command frameworks.
The U.S. currently stands as Europe’s largest export market, representing over 20 per cent of European exports in early 2026. It also serves as the continent’s primary provider of risk capital for new business initiatives and is a key source of military capabilities essential for deterring Russia.
There are legitimate reasons to be optimistic that European governments can lessen their military dependence: defense expenditures are increasing, especially in northern and eastern European nations, and Europe is supporting Ukraine’s resistance against Russia while striving for deeper integration with Ukraine’s expanding military-industrial sector.
In theory, European governments have the capability to bypass U.S. goods, services, and currency from the public sector and to limit or prohibit their usage in the private sector, thus reducing the chances for a U.S. administration to make use of European reliance. This is, however, easier said than done. To encourage private enterprises to decrease their dependence on U.S. currency, financial systems, trade, and technology, European leaders would have to offer alternatives that are equally convenient, cost-efficient, and technologically advanced as those provided by the U.S. Currently, such options do not exist. For Europe to develop them swiftly could necessitate prohibitively high trade-offs: either sacrificing economic growth and productivity gains or becoming reliant on other suppliers, especially those from China.
‘Europe, for the time being, has few alternatives but to sustain the transatlantic economic relationship predominantly in its existing structure’
The European Central Bank is developing a digital euro intended for retail transactions, providing a secure method for private enterprises and financial institutions to conduct blockchain-based transactions. Collectively, these initiatives may establish the groundwork for a self-sufficient European cross-border payment system. The dilemma is that this system is anticipated to be operational only by the end of this decade. In other words, Europe, for the time being, has few alternatives but to sustain the transatlantic economic relationship predominantly in its existing structure.
In addition to the fact that nearly 25 per cent of Europe’s energy is derived from natural gas, this region may become increasingly reliant on the U.S. rather than less so. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Russian pipelines accounted for 40 to 45 per cent of Europe’s imports. However, in the years that followed, the EU has reportedly decreased its consumption of Russian gas from 45 per cent in 2021 to 15 per cent in 2023. This reduction would not have been feasible without the importation of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG), which saw an increase of more than four times between early 2022 and 2025 and, until the onset of the war in Iran this year, contributed to lowering EU gas prices after a surge in 2022–2023. For the moment, the U.S. and neighboring Norway are the EU’s primary suppliers of natural gas.
Taking into account that EU Member States, including Hungary, have reached an agreement to terminate all remaining imports of Russian natural gas by late 2027, U.S. imports are expected to become even more crucial. Brussels must swiftly identify alternatives to Russian natural gas or risk facing escalating prices. While it may be feasible to compensate for some of the deficit through additional pipeline supplies from Norway or the eastern Mediterranean, the majority of the shortfall will need to be addressed through LNG imports, to which the present U.S.–Israeli war with Iran exacerbates this challenge. Should Iran’s retaliatory attacks on Qatar’s LNG facilities, for example, result in significant damage, the bulk of the EU’s LNG will have to be sourced from the U.S., meaning, as Europe commits to phasing out Russian gas imports, its reliance on U.S. supply is set to increase.
There is also the EU’s continued dependence on China for critical raw materials and automotive inputs, a leverage point Beijing already has with the United States, which European governments are attempting to curtail in their favor. This does not mean that Europe is unable to lessen its economic and technological dependency on the U.S. Nevertheless, if Europe’s current focus remains on its competitiveness and economic growth, any cost-sensitive strategy will necessitate that the continent continues to depend on American innovation and economic contributions at levels comparable to those observed today.
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