Boris Kálnoky grew up in Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, and France. His family left Hungary in 1947. He studied Politics and History in Hamburg and began working at the German daily Die Welt in 1987. In 1995, he became the Balkans Correspondent for Die Welt, based in Budapest, and in 2004, he moved to Istanbul to serve as the Middle East Correspondent. He returned to Budapest in 2013, continuing his work for Die Welt. He also writes for several other media outlets in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Since 2020, he has served as Head of the Media School at Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Budapest and later became the deputy editor-in-chief of the print edition of Mandiner, a conservative Hungarian newspaper.

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You are partly a foreigner, and you’ve worked as a correspondent for Die Welt and Die Presse, which gives you a certain distance from Hungarian political affairs. From that perspective, what do you see as Hungary’s importance in Europe? What gives the country political weight?

In democracies, conversation is of paramount importance, and to have a conversation, you need to have different points of view. That has become a rare thing in the European Union. I think this is the function of Hungary in the European Union. It’s the voice that begs to differ. We have a new phenomenon in Europe where everyone tends to say and think the same, and Hungary is a little bit like the devil’s advocate. Every single decision that the EU is preparing, every single policy subject—they come with this mantra of, we need this because European solidarity demands it. Hungary is always the one voice that says: ‘Yes, but does it make sense?’, and that’s important for the debate—even when Hungary is wrong. To ask the question is important.

In this aspect, what is the significance of the upcoming Hungarian election, which will be held in spring?

That Hungarian voice in the European Union, which helps the general conversation, will disappear if the opposition party wins. They are campaigning on the slogan: ‘We will bring back the European funds that are owed to us, that are owed to Hungary.’ The European Union is blocking these funds because the Hungarian government refuses to do and say a number of things that they would like it to do and say. So if the opposition says: ‘We will bring home the EU funds, it means they will accept all the conditions of the EU for Hungary—and that means the unique Hungarian voice within the EU will disappear.

‘Hungary is always the one voice that says: “Yes, but does it make sense?”’

This is the narrative of the government: they are the sovereignists who step up in defence of Hungarian interests, while the opposition party, the Tisza Party, is the servant of Brussels. Is this narrative realistic?

Well, Tisza says: ‘No, we are not the servants of Brussels’—they would never say that, obviously. Their narrative is: we are like Orbán, we are like Fidesz, you can vote for us, you get to keep all the things that you like about Orbán and Fidesz, but we will get rid of the things that people don’t like. And by that, they mean corruption. Corruption, in their narrative, is visible in the fact that a former good acquaintance of Viktor Orbán, Lőrinc Mészáros, and a few others have become very rich since 2010, so they say it’s because of corruption, and they campaign with it.

Is this new phenomenon of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party good for Hungarian democracy? The polls indicate that the competition is very close.

Yes, absolutely. It has revitalized Hungarian politics. In the formal model, Fidesz could essentially go to sleep, and be sure to be re-elected, because on the other side, you had six different parties, who were all fighting each other, and they were hating each other more than they were hating Orbán. Now, although the politicians themselves have no merit in it at all, voters of the former opposition parties decided to all join the movement of Péter Magyar, so de facto they have created a quasi two party system—now we have two big parties, and that means Fidesz must really wake up and make an effort to convince voters of why it makes more sense for them to vote for Fidesz. Obviously, that’s good for Hungarian politics.

‘[The Tisza Party] will accept all the conditions of the EU for Hungary’

Is Fidesz successful in its persuation of their voters that the party is the one to vote for?

It depends on how you view politics. If you’re a liberal globalist, you want to fight against Putin, you want the EU to be unified—then Orbán will not be an option for you. But if you’re the type of voter who says: ‘Okay, what’s in it for me? What will I get personally if Tisza wins, and what am I getting if Fidesz wins?’—these voters can now count what’s in the promises of each party.

Fidesz has just started a programme to enable young people to buy a small flat with loans at very good interest rates. And they have essentially forced Péter Magyar to disclose his tax reform programme. He had never really said anything substantial before. He had said that they would bring income tax down to 9 per cent (it’s now 15 per cent). One Hungarian media outlet published a document alleging that Tisza is preparing to introduce a progressive tax system, with taxes of 15 per cent for the lowest incomes, then 22 per cent for middle incomes, and 33 per cent for higher incomes. This led to a furious response on social media, and Tisza’s media said it was not true. We don’t know if it’s true, but they were then forced to present a programme—and now they say that 9 per cent is only for the minimal income.

These factors will definitely have some effect on the popularity of the two parties. But after gaining two-thirds majorities in four elections, Fidesz has now started to lose some of its popularity. What factors is this due to?

Orbán himself said it: in any democratic political system, when real incomes shrink, you get fewer votes. Whoever is in power gets punished. First we had COVID, then the war in Ukraine and the inflation that came along with it—and all of that led to something we’ve seen across Western countries: essentially, the shrinking of the middle class. The whole policy of all Orbán governments has been about building a middle class. After communism, there was no middle class—and no mentality you would call ‘polgári’ in Hungarian, or ‘civic’ in English. So they had to rebuild that from scratch. Orbán’s mantra was: you cannot have a functioning democracy without a strong middle class. So everything was about building a middle class with children and a bit of money to live a good life.

‘The whole policy of all Orbán governments has been about building a middle class’

So that has taken a hit since 2020 and all the way to 2024. It’s coming back a little bit, but the feeling that ‘it’s been better’ has weakened.

A little shift from Hungarian politics to European-level politics. You mentioned that Fidesz policies have been criticized by European powers significantly since Orbán took office for the second time in 2010. Why?

First of all, all the media contacts in Hungary—and the contacts of politicians, Eurocrats, European bureaucrats—they’re all with the former left-wing and liberal governing parties. They didn’t have many contacts with Fidesz, and Fidesz didn’t pay much attention to developing networks inside the European Union. I think that was a mistake. In Brussels, you have a culture in that bureaucratic bubble where everyone has known each other forever, and Fidesz has never tried to build networks within that. The second thing is that Fidesz introduced a media law to reform the media—the public media—and journalists felt they were being targeted as a profession.

Essentially, Fidesz has always been about creating maximum room for manoeuvre for Hungary. National interest is what they believe they represent. It’s their duty, as an elected government of Hungary, to look after the interests of the Hungarian people. That’s not the same as the interests of a transnational structure like the EU, where dominant powers—Germany, France—have a lot of influence. So here you have a conflict. And Hungary has hurt the interests of powerful lobbyists in Germany, in France, and in the EU by taking measures to direct more of the money coming from the EU to Hungarian companies. Before that, those funds had mostly gone to German, French, or Italian companies.

They say that Hungary doesn’t keep the rules of the same club it joined. Rule of law matters, corruption, and not implementing the European law into Hungarian legislation, such as asylum and migration policies, which the European Council agreed upon—these are the complaints.

I would argue.

But is there any truth in it?

Well, Hungary certainly goes all the way to the wall when it comes to trying to maximize its room for political manoeuvre, but the rule of law argument has been weaponized by the European Union in order to create a more federalist political structure.

‘It’s their duty…to look after the interests of the Hungarian people. That’s not the same as the interests of a transnational structure like the EU’

If you talk to the experts who write studies on this, they’ll say that the whole thing—like the conditionality mechanism (if you don’t stick to these rules, you won’t get money)—means that the effect will be to federalise the EU. It limits member states’ ability to take decisions mandated by their own voters. European laws state that it is illegal to enter the territory of the European Union without travel documents or a visa, and Hungary is being punished—with €1 million a day—by a decision of the European Court of Justice, for not letting people without travel documents or visas onto its territory. So Hungary is, in fact, upholding the law, and is being punished for doing so by a European court of law. If you look at that from the perspective of the rule of law, you can’t help asking yourself: what’s the logic behind it?

Patriots: this is a new political bloc in the European Parliament and in European politics overall. Fidesz and some other right-wing sovereignist parties have formed this coalition. Do you believe that this bloc can change Brussels—as Hungarian politics often calls the European Union—in the near future?

It’s already had an impact. Orbán himself, even before the Patriots, has had an impact simply through his messaging. Just by picking up subjects—picking up problems that are important for many European citizens—and the mainstream politicians and bureaucrats realise: ‘Yes, they’re right, we need to do something. But we can never admit that they’re right.’ So instead, the thinking becomes: ‘We have to hit them harder, while at the same time picking up on the very subjects that are, in fact, important.’ The European stance towards migration has changed massively since 2015. All the things Hungary was saying then—and what the Patriots are saying now—most of that has now become part of official European policies. Except, they still want to bring people in legally. Hungary doesn’t want that. The Patriots don’t want that.

‘Hungary is, in fact, upholding the law, and is being punished for doing so’

But in terms of illegal migration, it’s not the official policy of the EU that you can enter illegally into the territory of the EU. You should submit your request for asylum outside of the EU’s territory, and then it will be looked at by authorities. This is what Hungary was asking even in 2015.

Finally, a question about journalism—a quote from you. You posted this question on your Facebook page: ‘Is there any need for objective journalism in Hungary?’ And you received many answers from your friends—approximately two-thirds of them said yes. So, we need objective journalism. Is there objective journalism in Hungary?

First of all, many dear colleagues—on both sides of the political spectrum—don’t wake up in the morning thinking: ‘Oh, today I want to manipulate the masses again.’ Journalists normally want to tell the truth and have a good story: one that is correct, that is true.

However, journalism has never been objective. In Hungary, under communism, obviously every existing media outlet was an instrument of Communist propaganda. Then in the early 1990s, they were privatized, and there was a deal with foreign investors that most of the journalists would stay in their jobs—but the media outlets were now in foreign ownership. And they were then called ‘independent media’, owned by Axel Springer and the likes of them. To attack them for being unobjective was, at the time, seen as an attack on press freedom. That gave a huge disadvantage to conservatives in Hungarian politics, because all the existing media outlets continued to be predominantly left-wing.

Starting from around 2005 or 2006, Fidesz realized that this wouldn’t change, so they began encouraging businessmen from their own camp to buy or found media outlets. And the result is that now you have two big camps: an anti-government camp, and a pro-government camp. And the people—the readers, the viewers—got caught in the middle. They have to read and watch everything if they want to understand what’s going on. And actually, they do read everything. And I believe the very fact that they do try to get information by looking at everything means they want objective information. But there are many in Hungary, including officials, including people with influence in the national conversation—many who think there’s no need, no desire, for objective journalism. In fact, there’s a new phenomenon which says: objectivity doesn’t exist. And we know it doesn’t exist, right? But you still have to strive for it.

‘The very fact that [people] do try to get information by looking at everything means they want objective information’

It actually is a narrative of right-wing journalism, shaped by this historical experience. They feel that while left-wing journalism presents itself as independent, in reality it is very biased. But that doesn’t mean there’s no need for independent journalism.

There’s a new stance now—that there’s no such thing as real, complete objectivity. In my time, it was evident that we had to strive for it. Now, that is being replaced with a narrative that objectivity doesn’t exist—and that means we don’t even have to try. Let’s fight for the cause on both sides.

Which is a very big mistake, in my opinion. If a journalist decides to become an influencer, that is okay. If a media company is proud of being openly left or right-wing, that’s okay too. But that doesn’t mean another paper cannot try to be objective or independent, with honest reporting and investigative journalism. What is the reason that a solid conservative paper like The Spectator or The Daily Telegraph couldn’t be founded in Hungary?

Well, I’m maybe too foreign to fully understand the Hungarian mindset, but I suspect one reason is how Hungarians look at the media. There is an ingrained feeling that someone is trying to manipulate you if they own a media outlet. So, if we assume there was something like The Daily Telegraph in Hungary—meaning it’s conservative, but it will attack a conservative government when it feels the government’s decisions are wrong—by attacking the government, the paper shows that it’s independent. Everyone could see that it’s a conservative newspaper with conservative values, and you could have the same thing on the left, obviously.

Now, if you do that in Hungary, I can imagine it might hurt you economically on both sides—it doesn’t matter. How are you going to get your advertisements, your financing, and how will people buy it at the kiosk? That’s gone; people would have to subscribe online. But Hungarians don’t do that. So it’s a difficult undertaking. I teach journalism, and some of my students have said: ‘Come on, Boris, why don’t you start a media outlet? We would like to read that.’ But I don’t think it’s economically feasible, because Hungarians will not pay for it online or offline. And whatever you write, whenever you hurt someone’s interests—it doesn’t matter whose interest—it will always have disagreeable consequences.

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