Hungarian Conservative

Standing on the ground of inexorable social progress, Prohászka views social transformation positively, and even despite his harsh criticism of socialism, he acknowledges its necessity. After all, social democracy serves to achieve social progress that ‘excludes the phraseology of delusive emotions and disturbing social passions,’[vi] which is otherwise so problematic in revolutionary change.

In this piece, we will present an interesting albeit largely forgotten debate that raged in the early ‘40s about Prohászka’s legacy and the expression Hungarianism.

‘I can only say that if I were a Jew, I would be a Zionist. . . And you see, I am considered antisemitic.’

Nature, to Prohászka, reflected the initial will and grace of God, a gift bestowed upon humanity that they had to cherish, nurture, and also protect. This was in a sense connected to the image of humanity, reflected in Prohászka’s writings.

We can see Prohászka as a fascinating yet divisive author whose works are still being debated today.

Faludy, one of the greatest Hungarian poets and literary translators of the 20th century, never really found his place in any system; he sooner or later became a nuisance to everyone, and even if sometimes made compromises, always did so provocatively, originally and with talent.

Losing the World War and the experience of the Treaty of Trianon triggered a discourse in Hungarian public life that was not without precedent, but had never been so vehement before. Perhaps the opinion of many was reflected by the renowned writer Ferenc Herczeg, who declared that ‘Europe, free press, liberalism—all these are slogans that have deceived us.’

According to the most fundamental concept of the Holy Crown doctrine, everyone who has political rights in the territory of the country is a member of the crown, a part of its ‘body’.

‘Bangha considered “social redistribution and governmental intervention to be appropriate tools”. These tools, according to Bangha, create the possibility to eliminate the imbalances that—as he puts it—are caused by mega-wealth concentrated in a few hands. In turn, these measures are embedded in a larger social reform, meaning the reformation of public life based on the Christian spirit and the re-elevation of Christianity to the status of the state’s main principle.’

The majority of the refugees were intellectuals, mostly from Transylvania, followed by those from what is Slovakia, Serbia and Austria today, but there were also some who fled to Hungary from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The gap between reality and the striving for a pure Christian social life angered many conservative public figures in the Horthy era. In his diary, Prohászka wrote that for Hungarian men, ‘using a prostitute is like drinking a cup of coffee’.

While generational differences pushed one group of young men into the camp of the contemporary nationalist right, that did not necessarily determine their later life choices. Generational experiences did define men to some extent—but it was political and moral choices that had the final say.

The approach of Weis to welfare, an attitude that in fact prevailed under the Teleki government, was not only sensitive to social issues, but also subscribed to the idea of an ‘anti-capitalist democracy’, and also to ‘progress’ and ‘social justice’.

In order to understand where to move forward, first, we must look at our past, our history, so that we become able to identify our strengths, weaknesses and our spiritual resources.

The writer Dezső Szabó had many periods in his career—pro-Catholic, strongly protestant, bourgeoise radical, communist, anti-semitic and finally, anti-Nazi—, but in the early twenties, he was definitely going through a nationalist and anti-semitic phase. His contemporary speeches and articles provide much of the reason why contemporary historians label him an extremist.

The early twenties in Hungary brought about not only a fervent nationalist discussion about Trianon, the Romani or antisemitism, but also illusory concepts regarding the Eastern roots of the Hungarian people.

Left-wing Zionism is barely alive, while right-wing secular Zionism has been dominant until now, but the previous Israeli prime minister was already something Nordau could never have envisioned: a kippah-wearing ex-officer of the IDF, Naftali Bennett.

This chapter of the interwar system needs to be reckoned with, if only to illustrate the progress the Hungarian right has made since then: today, small neo-Protestant Christian churches are allies of the right in Hungary, and not treated as adversaries.

In this two-part article we will explore the main reasons behind the conflict, which proved to be one of the most serious anti-Calvinist offenses of the period.

The situation of the Gypsies in this period ranged from tolerance and jovial disdain to exclusion, which literary historian János Hankiss characterized a quarter of a century later by saying that the Gypsies were ‘relatable strangers’ in Hungarian culture.

Today there are about 30 thousand abortions per year in Hungary, as opposed to the peak reached under socialism with nearly 200 thousand pregnancy terminations per year.

The story of Zadravecz’s controversial years well illustrates the fascinating internal debates and lively public life of the early Horthy period, as well as the divisions between Christian churches in a period which desperately called for Christian unity. 

Bangha was hated by everyone: the protestants because he was a traditional Catholic, the Catholics because of his supposed compromises, the racists because he was seen as a liberal, the liberals because they thought he was still an antisemite, and the pro-Horthy government because they thought Bangha was a Habsburg loyalist.

‘We try and keep the illusion awake in ourselves that we can cross to Nagyvárad or drop by to Nagyszalonta and then run from Makó to Arad, as it used to be—so natural, so self-evident. And then all of a sudden, we realise it is no longer possible.’

The editor’s basic thesis is the irreconcilable opposition between conservative and liberal ideas, in contrast to the Western European trend that conservatism can be liberal.

PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY László Ottlik and the Traditions of Hungarian Political Thought Political philosophy that is clearly separated from legal philosophy could not really take root in Hungary either in

The guiding thread of Hungarian conservative thinking has always been to represent the Hungarian national interest, and thus the preservation of the country’s sovereignty and freedom—this is understood to supersede any theoretical concepts.