Donald Trump has already initiated the withdrawal of the United States from several organizations dealing with climate change, and has now sent a clear message to the International Energy Agency (IEA): unless it abandons treating climate objectives as a priority, the United States will also leave this organization. In light of these developments, it seems worthwhile to pause for a moment and assess where the global fight against climate change currently stands.

To begin with, anyone attempting to provide an accurate diagnosis of this struggle faces a no easy task. It is a battle in which some fronts show encouraging progress, while elsewhere we are suffering significant losses. Let me map the frontlines—where we are losing, and where we are gaining ground in the struggle against climate change.

Where We Are Falling Behind

The picture is bleak if we consider the level of attention climate change receives today. The world is uncertain, turbulent, and undergoing transformation. The upward trajectory of climate awareness was first disrupted by COVID-19, followed by geopolitical tensions, wars, economic slowdown and inflation across Europe, and in some countries, the consequences of mismanaged migration crises.

People have not turned away from environmental sustainability; they still consider it important. However, among the many problems they face, the issue has been pushed further down the list of concerns. It is our evolutionary trait that we cannot worry about everything at once. We tend to prioritize those threats that feel more immediate or close to us—whether in time, space, or psychological proximity. Illness, war, living costs, and deteriorating public security in Europe currently pose more pressing existential challenges for us than climate change. As of now, this has not always been the case, and one may hope it will not remain so.

Research on agenda-setting, content analysis, and public opinion consistently confirms that climate change concerns people less today than at the turn of the decade.

This shift in attention has also been reflected in the market. Demand for environmentally beneficial but more expensive products—such as vegan, organic, and bio foods, electric vehicles, and services with a lower carbon footprint (for example, ‘greened’ flights or accommodation) has declined in inverse proportion to rising price sensitivity.

The declining public focus on green issues has also become visible in political life. In both EU and national parliamentary elections, green parties have, overall, lost ground, and green policy platforms have generally diminished in importance—including in Hungary. Around the 2022 elections, the MCC Climate Policy Institute conducted a comparative analysis of the green programmes of opposition parties. Today, not only have these political programmes faded, but parties and politicians representing green agendas (such as LMP, Párbeszéd, and Momentum) have largely disappeared from the political stage.

A similar trend can be observed in global politics. The reputation of international organizations dealing with climate policy is declining. Their operational shortcomings and inefficiencies have been highlighted not only by Trump, but also by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney—often seen as a counterpoint to the Trump phenomenon within North America—in his landmark speech in Davos.

‘Research on…public opinion consistently confirms that climate change concerns people less today than at the turn of the decade’

At the last UN climate summit (COP30), several of the largest emitting countries were not represented at a high level, and no decisive agreements shaping the future were reached. Perhaps the most significant blow to the cause came when Donald Trump began withdrawing the United States from major international climate frameworks (including the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC, and the IPCC), while repeatedly describing the fight against climate change as one of the world’s greatest hoaxes or scams.

These developments have undoubtedly hindered climate action—yet even before these political moves, the results of the struggle against climate change had remained very limited. In reality, no systemic green transition is taking place globally. The share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix has been largely unchanged over the past decade. Despite green rhetoric, coal, oil, and natural gas still account for roughly 80–85 per cent of primary energy consumption—including heating, transport, logistics, and electricity generation.

Meanwhile, atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise. The concentration of CO₂—the most frequently cited warming gas—has increased from around 400 ppm in 2015 to over 420–425 ppm today. Even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has now formally acknowledged that overshooting the critical 1.5°C threshold is unavoidable.

The situation is similarly alarming in other areas: global waste generation is increasing, biodiversity is declining at an alarming rate, extreme weather events are becoming more frequent, and both soil quality and water resources are deteriorating.

These are our losses on the battlefield of climate change. The overall balance is negative—yet there are also smaller victories, and areas where prospects are more encouraging.

Where We Are Performing Better

First, climate policy today is less marked by extremes than in previous years. Green radicalism appears to be receding both from mainstream politics and civil activism. Actions ranging from alarmism to direct vandalism—such as blocking highways, damaging and smearing masterpieces of art, or campaigning against childbirth in the name of climate protection—have become far less common.

High-profile civil organizations, including those active in Hungary, are increasingly focusing on professional work rather than engaging in political activism and launching communication campaigns. Meanwhile, less professional, activist-driven groups and green movements have either quieted down or disappeared altogether.

A cautious recalibration is also underway in European green policymaking. Witnessing the failures or setbacks of former green agendas, more countries are attempting to align environmental sustainability with industrial, business, and social policy considerations.

In Germany, the Greens—who previously held three ministerial posts—were excluded from the governing coalition in 2025. Several flagship policies have since been revised or softened: the planned VAT increase on meat products was abandoned; mandatory green heating regulations (GEG) were diluted; the German Supply Chain Act (LKSG) was weakened; the renewable energy surcharge (EEG) was removed from electricity prices; and the national carbon pricing system (BEHG) has been effectively frozen compared to the original plans.

While some may interpret these changes as a retreat from climate ambition, they may instead represent an effort to make climate policy more socially acceptable. By bringing it closer to voters and addressing its legitimacy gaps, these adjustments could ultimately provide renewed momentum.

‘A cautious recalibration is also underway in European green policymaking’

A similar—albeit delayed and uncertain—course of policy correction is visible at the EU level. While the European Green Deal still conflicts in several respects with the continent’s economic, social, and geopolitical interests, faint signs of political pragmatism are tangible. ESG obligations are being introduced more gradually and with a narrower scope; the 2035 ban on internal combustion engine vehicles has been softened; and the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System to buildings and transport (ETS2) is likely to be postponed.

Although the United States’ withdrawal from climate cooperation represents a setback, it is encouraging that China has not ‘thrown in the towel’. On the contrary, as is often the case, it appears determined to demonstrate its capabilities.

The world’s second-largest economy continues to pursue its green transformation agenda with consistency. Its latest 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) maintains a strong focus on emissions targets, energy transition, and green development. Moreover, China may be reducing its greenhouse gas emissions faster than previously pledged.

Solar capacity expanded by 43 per cent in a single year, wind power by 14 per cent, and carbon-free nuclear electricity generation by 8 per cent, while coal-based power generation declined by 1.9 per cent. As a result, China’s CO₂ emissions decreased in 2025.

Encouragingly, recent projections suggest that India may also achieve a faster-than-expected green transition. As the world’s third-largest emitter, it is now benefiting from significantly lower costs in renewable energy and battery technologies, potentially allowing it to decarbonize more efficiently than the EU, the United States, or even China did at a comparable stage of development.

A Shift from the West to the East

The fight against climate change has not stopped, but its dynamics have changed significantly. The driving force of the green transformation is shifting from the West to the East.

Those states will succeed that are able to balance environmental, economic, and social considerations—without attempting to prioritize one at the expense of the others. The Budapest Declaration, signed as a key milestone of Hungary’s EU presidency, reflects precisely this need for balance. Its principles should be taken seriously and consistently implemented across the European Union.

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